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I. INTRODUCTION 
The over 900,000 K-12 students who are enrolled in 
Minnesota’s 2214 public schools in 347 school districts are taught 
by 70,000 teachers, a very small portion of whom are discharged 
from their positions each year because of their professional 
performance or personal behavior.1  Among that small number of 
teachers, districts have little difficulty terminating teachers who are 
still within their three-year probationary periods for they, like any 
at-will employee, can typically be discharged for any reason or no 
reason at all.2  However, school districts face a far more daunting 
challenge when they attempt to terminate teachers who are past 
their probationary periods because non-probationary teachers 
enjoy significant job protections under Minnesota law.3 
Critics of public education in general, and the teachers’ 
statutory protections in particular, complain that it has become 
virtually impossible to fire bad public school teachers in 
Minnesota.4  However, others who disagree with those critics argue 
that teachers sometimes need to be protected from unfair, even 
vindictive, administrators and school boards, and that when it is 
genuinely necessary to remove a teacher from the classroom, there 
are ways to do so quietly and respectfully.5 
 
 1. Debra O'Connor & Theresa Monsour, Rewarding The Best Teachers, 
Replacing Bad Apples Not So Easy Training, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 1, 1997, at 
A1.  “While no one tracks teacher firings specifically, educators estimate there are 
from 50 to 100 each year in Minnesota.”  Id. 
 2. See infra Part III (discussing probationary teachers). 
 3. See MINN. STAT. § 122A.40 (2002) (originally enacted as MINN. STAT. § 
125.12 (1941)); MINN. STAT. § 122A.41 (2002) (originally enacted as MINN. STAT. § 
125.17 (1953)).  Contracts of tenured teachers that do not expressly incorporate 
provisions of tenure law are deemed to impliedly incorporate such provisions 
including all amendments to law as they are made.  Minn. Ass'n of Pub. Sch. v. 
Hanson, 287 Minn. 415, 423, 178 N.W.2d 846, 852 (1970). 
 4. O'Connor & Monsour, supra note 1, at A1 (“Minnesota's laws, traditions 
and bureaucracy make it difficult both to fire inept teachers and to reward 
exceptionally good ones.”). 
 5. Id.  Judy Schaubach, President of the then Minnesota Education 
Association teacher organization, stated, “There's a huge misconception that the 
union is about protecting bad teachers.  We do routinely counsel people out of 
the profession if they can't make those changes.  It's a reflection on all of us.”  Id.  
However, the union has endorsed taking an active role in keeping quality 
teachers—supporting mentorship programs for new teachers, for example—and 
helping others, even if it means helping them out the door.  Id.  On the other 
hand, James Knutson, of Knutson, Flynn and Deans (a Mendota Heights law firm 
specializing in school law and representing many school districts in the state) 
stated, “It is not impossible (to fire a teacher), ([b]ut) a difficulty is who is going 
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss1/9
VERPLOEG(LS &CB).DOC 10/3/2004  9:42:09 PM 
2004] TERMINATING PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS 305 
This debate is among the most heated in public education.  
Unfortunately, perceptions often drive reality.  Stories abound of 
teachers who have unfairly been driven from the profession, 
protesting little because of the perception that it is futile to fight 
the district.  At the same time, stories circulate of school districts—
similarly overwhelmed by a sense of helplessness—that continue to 
tolerate poor, even harmful, teachers, or that manage to foist them 
on other unsuspecting districts.6  The public is also affected by 
conflicting perceptions that even good teachers are at risk or that 
bad teachers successfully hide behind tenure. These perceptions 
can play a powerful role in determining the extent to which voters 
are willing to support funding requests for public education. 
It is important to understand the realities that surround the 
discharge of a teacher, for embarking upon this path promises to 
be painful for everyone involved.  Teachers who challenge 
allegations that they are personally or professionally unworthy of 
continuing to teach in their districts—or perhaps to continue to 
teach at all—understandably experience extraordinary trauma and 
anxiety.  By the same token, districts that ultimately fail to prove 
the case for discharge can face significant financial liability and 
may even be forced to reinstate teachers who have been found to 
be deficient.  Finally, these efforts often divide schools and 
communities because teachers, students, and parents are called to 
testify for and against a teacher. 
This article seeks to shed some light on this challenging 
subject by examining Minnesota law concerning teacher 
discharges, as Minnesota’s courts and arbitrators have interpreted 
it.  It is hoped that this guide will assist everyone who must deal 
with the difficult issues that surround the proposed discharge of a 
teacher for cause. 
 
to come forward . . . .  School districts can’t fish out all of the problems teachers 
are having because of the limited number of administrators we have to conduct 
observations and evaluations.”  Id. 
 6. See id.  Only since 1989 have school districts been required to report 
terminations to the State Board of Teaching.  Knutson said years ago that teachers 
could be fired in one district and go to another to teach:  “Years ago, I terminated 
the same chap in four or five school districts.  He went from one district to 
another.  We were like friends.”  Id. 
3
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II. HISTORY 
Minnesota law concerning teacher discharges can be traced in 
large part to nationwide debates that took place throughout the 
1920s during a period of very high teacher turnover in many school 
districts.7  Investigation revealed that much of this turnover was the 
result of boards firing teachers for non-job-related reasons such as: 
local politics, a teacher’s residing outside the district, favoritism to 
friends and relatives, undercutting opposition to board policies, or 
seeking to hire lesser-paid, new teachers.8 
Two competing philosophies arose in response to these 
findings.9 One philosophy supported creating tenure for teachers.10 
Tenure would mean that teachers who successfully completed a 
probationary period of one to five years would thereafter retain 
their positions unless discharged for cause, and then only after 
being given various due process protections including notice and 
an opportunity to be heard.11  In contrast, a competing school of 
thought urged adopting a continuing contract philosophy, whereby 
a teacher’s contract would be automatically renewed each year 
unless the school district terminated it by a certain deadline set by 
statute.12  The continuing contract approach would obviously give a 
school district more discretion than would a tenure system. 
In 1927, the Minnesota Legislature took its first foray into this 
arena by passing a tenure law for teachers in Duluth, Minneapolis, 
and St. Paul—cities referred to in the statute as “cities of the first 
class.”13  Ten years later, the legislature passed a continuing 
contract law, the Lager Bill, for all other teachers in the state.14  The 
 
 7. Harley M. Ogata, History of Continuing Contract and Tenure Law in 
Minnesota, in MINNESOTA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION: FOURTH ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE ON SCHOOL LAW & LIABILITY § 1 (1995) [hereinafter History]; 
Telephone Interview with Harley M. Ogata, General Counsel, Education 
Minnesota (April 14, 2004) [hereinafter Ogata Interview]. 
 8. History, supra note 7, at 1; Ogata Interview, supra note 7. 
 9. See History, supra note 7, at 2. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.; Ogata Interview, supra note 7. 
 12. History, supra note 7, at 2; Ogata Interview, supra note 7, at 2. 
 13. 1 MINN. STAT. §§ 2935-1 to -14 (Mason 1927) (referring to the section laws 
named “Teachers - Employment in First Class Cities”); History, supra note 7. 
 14. 3 MINN. STAT. § 2903 (Mason Supp. 1940) (this statute codified the Lager 
Bill); see History, supra note 7, at 3. 
4
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curious consequence of these two statutes was that teachers in 
Minnesota’s three largest cities could be fired only for cause and 
only after being accorded basic due process protections.15  In 
contrast, all other districts in the state could discharge their 
teachers after each school year simply by giving notice by the 
statutory deadline.16  It wasn’t until forty years later, in 1967, that 
the legislature formally added the same due process protections to 
the continuing contract law that the tenure law had included from 
the beginning.17 
Thus, the Minnesota law that governs the discharge of non-
probationary teachers is in fact a compilation of two statutes.18  
Minnesota Statutes section 122A.41,19 also known as the Teacher 
Tenure Act, governs the discharge of tenured teachers in the “first 
class” cities of Duluth, Minneapolis, and St. Paul.  Minnesota 
Statutes section 122A.40,20 also known as the Continuing Contract 
Act, governs the discharge of “continuing contract” teachers in all 
other cities.  However, as the following discussion will demonstrate, 
as a practical matter, both statutes’ substantive and procedural 
protections are in many ways the same in their terms and in how 
they have been applied by the courts and in arbitration.21 
III. STATUTES’ COVERAGE 
Given the significant protections that Minnesota education law 
provides to teachers, it is important to understand who is and who 
is not covered by its provisions. 
 
 15. See 3 MINN. STAT. § 2903 (Mason Supp. 1940); 1 MINN. STAT. §§ 2935-1 to -
14 (Mason 1927); History, supra note 7, at 3. 
 16. 3 MINN. STAT. § 2903 (Mason Supp. 1940); see also History, supra note 7, at 
3. 
 17. See Ogata Interview, supra note 7, at 3; MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 6(e) 
(1967) (formerly codified as 3 MINN. STAT. § 2903 (Mason Supp. 1940), later 
codified as MINN. STAT. § 130.18 (1941), now codified at MINN. STAT. § 125.12 
(1961)). 
 18. See MINN. STAT. §§ 125.12, 125.17 (1967). 
 19. Id. § 122A.41 (2002). 
 20. Id. § 122A.40 . 
 21. See infra Part III;  Jurkovich v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 708, Tower-Soudan, 
478 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).  “Tenure rights” under the Teacher 
Tenure Act (MINN. STAT. § 122A.41 (2002)) are equivalent to “continuing contract 
rights” under statute providing procedural protections for teachers (MINN. STAT. § 
122A.40 (2002)), and the two terms are used interchangeably.  Jurkovich, 478 
N.W.2d. at 233 n.1 (citing Westguard v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 745, 400 N.W.2d 341, 
344 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), pet. for review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 1987)). 
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The Teacher Tenure Act, which covers teachers in Duluth, 
Minneapolis, and St. Paul—collectively referred to as “cities of the 
first class”—broadly defines a teacher as 
[e]very person regularly employed, as a principal, or to 
give instruction in a classroom, or to superintend or 
supervise classroom instruction, or as placement teacher 
and visiting teacher.  Persons regularly employed as 
counselors and school librarians shall be covered by 
sections as teachers if licensed as teachers or as school 
librarians.22 
Likewise, the Continuing Contract Act, which applies to 
teachers in cities other than the first class, defines a teacher as “[a] 
principal, supervisor, and classroom teacher and any other 
professional employee required to hold a license from the state 
department.”23 
Probationary teachers receive virtually no protection under 
these provisions. The vast majority of cases that raise coverage 
issues have involved teachers denied statutory protection on the 
grounds that they were still in their three-year probationary 
periods.24  Interestingly, neither the Teacher Tenure Act nor the 
Continuing Contract Act sets a minimum number of hours a 
teacher must work to receive credit for one year toward the three 
years of probation.  Thus, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has 
found that a teacher who worked only seventy-nine hours during a 
school year nevertheless had served one year of probation.25  A 
Minnesota Attorney General’s Opinion also agrees that 
[a] contract between the school board and a teacher who 
is serving his probationary period is an “annual contract . . 
.  Therefore, it is our opinion that an annual contract 
satisfied one year of the required probationary period . . . 
regardless of the length of actual teaching services 
rendered during such period.26 
 
 22. MINN. STAT. § 122A.41, subd. 1(a) (2002). 
 23. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 1. 
 24. See Kevin J. Rupp, Probationary Teachers, in MINNESOTA CONTINUING LEGAL 
EDUCATION: THE EIGHTH ANNUAL SCHOOL LAW CONFERENCE § 6 (1999) for a more 
detailed examination of teacher probation in Minnesota. 
 25. Flaherty v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2144, Chisago Lakes Sch., 577 N.W.2d 
229, 235-36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
 26. 5 Minn. Op. Att’y Gen. 90 (1972).  This opinion does not extend to a 
substitute teacher who is hired to replace an absent regular teacher or a regular 
teacher on a leave of absence.  See id. 
6
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More recently, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that a 
school district’s failure to comply with the statutory requirement 
that districts evaluate their probationary teachers at least three 
times a year did not invalidate St. Louis Park’s discharge of a 
probationary teacher for budgetary reasons.27  The court observed 
that because the provision that mandated these evaluations did not 
identify any consequences for failure to comply, this could be 
construed as a directory statute, and failure to comply with 
directory statutes does not necessarily invalidate actions taken with 
respect to them.28  As the district had otherwise substantially 
complied with the statute by giving the teacher timely notice that 
her contract would not be renewed at end of the school year 
(despite never having evaluated the teacher once in her three years 
of teaching), the court held she had no right to a hearing to 
challenge the district’s discretionary right to discharge her.29 
A case not involving issues of probation, which explored the 
coverage of both the Teacher Tenure Act and the Continuing 
Contract Act, established that only persons who specifically fall 
within the express definitions of “teacher” qualify for these 
protections.30  The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that the 
definition of “teacher” under the Teacher Tenure Act is exclusive 
and the courts will not seek guidance from other education statutes 
that define that term.31  Given this unwillingness to look outside the 
statutes for help in applying the not always clear meaning of 
“teacher,” the courts have thus been obliged to tackle the task 
directly. 
In Board of Education v. Sand, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
declined to extend the statutory protections to a school 
superintendent’s administrative assistant whose duties involved 
research and statistical work incidental to school administration.32  
Since the position involved little or no superintending or 
supervising of classroom instruction and no classroom teaching, 
the assistant was not a “teacher” within the statutes’ definitions, 
regardless of how the term was defined in other statutes relating to 
 
 27. Savre v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283, St. Louis Park, 642 N.W.2d 467, 471-72 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 28. Id. at 472. 
 29. Id. at 472-73. 
 30. Bd. of Educ. v. Sand, 227 Minn. 202, 34 N.W.2d 689 (1948). 
 31. Id. at 210, 34 N.W.2d at 694. 
 32. Id. at 212, 34 N.W.2d at 695. 
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school matters. 33  The thrust of this case has been clear: the closer 
a person is to the classroom the more likely he or she will qualify as 
a “teacher” and thus fall within the statutory protections. 
IV. THE PROCESS OF DISCHARGE 
A teacher who protests his or her discharge (or demotion, as 
well, if in a “city of the first class”)34 has two possible bases for 
challenge: (1) the process the district followed in undertaking the 
discharge, or (2) the evidence upon which the district relied to 
support the discharge.  This section describes the process that a 
district must strictly follow35 to comply with the statutory 
requirements.36 
A. Starting the Process 
Both the Teacher Tenure Act and Continuing Contract Act 
prescribe the process a district must follow in proposing a teacher 
for discharge.  Although the process for both is similar, one very 
significant difference is the Continuing Contract Act’s requirement 
that school districts within its coverage must meet an April 1 
deadline in order to propose the discharge of a continuing 
contract teacher for professional incompetence.37  A district that 
fails to give a teacher notice of his or her deficient performance, an 
opportunity to remedy that performance, and the entire hearing 
process (notice, hearing, and decision) by the April 1 deadline 
must wait another year to initiate this process. 
The process of discharge is triggered when charges against an 
individual teacher are presented to a school board, and a majority 
of the board members vote to propose termination.38  Although a 
district administrator typically presents these charges, the Teacher 
 
 33. Id. at 209, 34 N.W.2d at 694. 
 34. MINN. STAT. § 122A.41, subd. 6 (Supp. 2003). 
 35. Both the Minnesota Supreme Court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
have stated that a school district must strictly comply with the statute’s 
requirements.  See, e.g., Shell v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 811, Wabasha, 301 Minn. 442, 
444, 223 N.W.2d 774, 775 (1974); In re Peterson, 472 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1991). 
 36. At the outset, however, it is important to note that this process applies 
only to district personnel who are specifically covered by the statute.  5 Minn. Op. 
Atty. Gen. No. 89 (1972). 
 37. MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 7(a) (2002). 
 38. Id. 
8
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Tenure Act specifically acknowledges the right of a person outside 
of the district to bring charges to the board’s attention, which the 
board may choose to pursue or disregard.39  Written notice must be 
given to a teacher proposed for discharge for cause.  Such a written 
notice must set forth in reasonable detail the grounds for the 
action and specifically advise the teacher of his or her right to elect 
a full hearing on the matter before either the board or an 
arbitrator.40 
The board’s notice to the teacher must also indicate the 
deadline for requesting this hearing.  The deadline is typically ten 
to fourteen days from the date of the notice, although timeframes 
can vary depending upon the basis for the discharge.41  A teacher 
who fails to request a hearing within the mandatory time limits is 
deemed to have acquiesced to the board’s proposed action,42 and a 
teacher who requests a hearing but does not specifically direct that 
it should be before an arbitrator is considered to have requested a 
school board hearing.43  A district that receives a teacher’s timely 
request for a hearing must schedule one and provide the teacher 
with notice of its time and location, making sure to give the teacher 
a reasonable time to prepare. 
Throughout this process it is essential that a district remain 
mindful of the teacher’s privacy rights under the Minnesota 
Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA).44  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Navarre v. South Washington 
County Schools45 is particularly instructive on the ways in which 
things can go horribly wrong when district officials reveal private 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.; MINN. STAT. § 122A.41, subd. 7 (2002). 
 41. Minnesota Statutes section 122A.40 has specific calendar deadlines for 
giving notice to a teacher who is proposed for termination on grounds set forth in 
subdivision 9.  A teacher proposed for termination on this basis must be so 
notified by April 1 and has fourteen days to request a hearing, which must take 
place in time to ensure final decision on the matter so that the termination is 
effective at the close of that school year.  In contrast, a district can propose a 
teacher’s discharge pursuant to the more serious immediate termination 
provisions of subdivision 13 at any time.  However, a teacher proposed for 
immediate discharge under subdivision 13 of the Teacher Tenure Act is given only 
ten days within which to request a hearing on that matter.  Minnesota Statutes 
section 122A.41, subdivision 7 provides a ten-day period for a teacher in a city of 
the first class to request a hearing. 
 42. MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 7(a) (2002). 
 43. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 15(a). 
 44. MINN. STAT. §§ 13.01-.99 (2002 & Supp. 2003). 
 45. 652 N.W.2d 9 (Minn. 2002). 
9
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personnel data before there has been a final disposition 
concerning a teacher’s discipline.  In Navarre, the district broadly 
released private data concerning a teacher’s classroom 
management and instruction, even sharing that information with 
the St. Paul Pioneer Press.46  The teacher won a jury verdict of 
$200,000 for loss of reputation, $250,000 for emotional distress, 
and $70,000 for loss of income or earning capacity.47  When the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case, the 
teacher appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court.48 
In a decision that largely favored the teacher, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court discussed the MGDPA at length and found that the 
district had violated the MGDPA’s clear terms when it released 
information concerning the complaints against the teacher while 
her discipline was still pending.49  The court emphasized that 
before final disposition, districts can disclose only the existence and 
status of complaints against the employee; they cannot provide 
more detailed information concerning the nature and types of 
those complaints.50  Because the district had indeed violated the 
statute on several different occasions, the court upheld its liability 
for emotional distress and loss of reputation damages.51  Although 
the court remanded the case for a new trial, it did so because the 
district court had committed several evidentiary errors.52  The 
underlying message remains clear and sobering: districts must 
maintain strict confidentiality while progressing through the 
discipline process. 
B. Arbitration 
Before 1991, a teacher who exercised his or her right to a 
hearing was given one before the very school board that had issued 
the notice of proposed termination.  For many years teachers and 
their representatives protested that this method of review—one in 
which the board was arguably prosecutor, judge, and jury—was 
fundamentally unfair.  Protests continued even after Minnesota 
 
 46. Id. at 17. 
 47. Id. at 20-21. 
 48. Navarre, 633 N.W.2d 40, 48 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 652 N.W.2d 9 
(Minn. 2002). 
 49. Navarre, 652 N.W.2d at 21. 
 50. Id. at 22-23. 
 51. Id. at 30. 
 52. Id. at 32. 
10
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courts began directing school boards to hire independent 
examiners to conduct the proceedings.  Ultimately, in 1991, the 
legislature amended Minnesota Statutes section 122A.40 and 
Minnesota Statutes section 122A.41 to grant Minnesota teachers 
the right to choose between a hearing before the board or before 
an arbitrator. 53  Since that time, virtually all teacher termination 
hearings have been held before an arbitrator. 
There are several reasons why teachers prefer arbitration to a 
board hearing and why the switch to arbitration has had a 
significant impact on teacher discharges.  First, arbitration 
addresses the concern that prompted its adoption in the first place: 
the perception that the board hearing system was unfair to 
teachers, even when presided over by hearing examiners.  
Arbitration gives teachers the right to participate in selecting the 
arbitrator, a person who is a recognized professional neutral and 
whose fee is shared equally by the parties.54 
In addition, before the 1991 amendments, the “substantial 
evidence” standard of proof was adopted in board hearings.  
Similarly, in hearings before a school board the Continuing 
Contract Act applies  “substantial and competent evidence”55 and 
“competent evidence”56 standards while the Teacher Tenure Act 
applies a “best interest of the school” standard.57  These standards 
are typically viewed as less burdensome than the “preponderance” 
standard arbitrators must apply under the Continuing Contract 
Act58 and Teacher Tenure Act.59 
Perhaps even more important is the quite different role 
arbitration plays as contrasted with a court’s role. When a board of 
education’s decision to discharge a teacher is appealed to the 
courts, discharge is already a fait accompli and the court sits as an 
appellate body to decide the appeal.  The question before the court 
is whether the board’s action was supported by “substantial 
evidence” in the record.  Within this framework, the courts have 
been guided by the principle that the board of education is acting 
in an administrative role when deciding to hire or fire a teacher: 
 
 53. MINN. STAT. §§ 122A.40, subd. 15, 122A.41, subd. 7 (2002). 
 54. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 15(b). 
 55. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 14. 
 56. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 16. 
 57. Id. § 122A.41, subd. 10. 
 58. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 15(c). 
 59. Id. § 122A.41, subd. 13(c). 
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“On appeal to this court, a school board’s decision to terminate a 
teacher will be set aside only if the decision is ‘fraudulent, arbitrary, 
unreasonable, not supported by substantial evidence on the record, 
not within the school board’s jurisdiction, or is based on an 
erroneous theory of law.’” 60 
The predictable result of this perspective is that the courts 
have overturned very few teacher discharges. In contrast, 
arbitration is a de novo rather than an appellate process;  
arbitrators do not review discharge as a fait accompli as do the 
courts, but instead conduct a de novo inquiry to determine 
whether a district has supported its proposed discharge of the 
teacher by a preponderance of the evidence in the record.  
Another significant aspect of both Acts’ characterization of the 
discharge as a “proposed discharge” is that under the Continuing 
Contract Act, a suspended teacher continues to be paid throughout 
the process,61 and although the Teacher Tenure Act does not 
contain the same requirement, if the teacher wins, the district must 
fully reimburse his or her back wages.62 
There is evidence that obtaining the right to go to arbitration 
has significantly affected the outcome of many teacher discharge 
cases.  True, it is difficult to track the actual results of all teacher 
terminations, for most are not appealed and the results of those 
that do go to a hearing are not necessarily widely reported.  
Nevertheless, it is revealing that attorneys at Education 
Minnesota—an organization that represents virtually every K-12 
public school teacher in the state—always elect arbitration rather 
than a board hearing when a teacher is proposed for discharge.63 
Moreover, although there is no concrete statistical data, these 
same advocates have expressed the sense that there have been 
more settlements since the Minnesota Legislature amended the 
Teacher Tenure and Continuing Contract Acts.  It is possible that 
the threat of arbitration now encourages at least some school 
districts to modify what before would have been all-or-nothing 
positions that gave teachers no choice but to resign or to litigate.64  
 
 60. Ostlund v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 47, Sauk Rapids, 354 N.W.2d 492, 496 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
 61. MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 13(a) (Supp. 2003). 
 62. Id. § 122A.41, subd. 12 (2002). 
 63. Ogata Interview, supra note 7. 
 64. William Garber, The Effects of Arbitration on Teacher Termination, in 
MINNESOTA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION: THE FIFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON 
SCHOOL LAW & LIABILITY § 10 at 16 (1996). 
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For example, because suspensions are not subject to arbitration 
under statute, some districts might now more often suspend a 
teacher rather than proceed directly to discharge.  However, it is 
noteworthy that suspensions are nevertheless subject to arbitration 
under collective bargaining agreements and also often result in 
reports to the Board of Teaching. 
Another reason the move to arbitration has been significant 
can be found in the courts’ diminishing role with respect to 
developing and refining the law concerning teacher discharges.  
Arbitration decisions are, with rare exception, “final and binding.”65  
This means that with most teacher discharges now decided in 
arbitration, the courts are no longer being called upon to interpret 
and apply the statutes’ provisions to the same extent as they did for 
so many years.  Thus, since 1991, there have been very few judicial 
pronouncements regarding the two statutes.  Certainly there have 
been no landmark decisions comparable to the guidance the courts 
provided in the cases of Kroll v. Independent School District No. 59366 
in 1981 and Downie v. Independent School District No. 14167 in 1985, 
both of which are discussed below. 
C. City of Brooklyn Center v. Law Enforcement Labor Services 
To the extent the courts were historically reluctant to overturn 
what they viewed as school board discretion to discharge a teacher 
for cause, they have been even less eager to overturn an arbitration 
award on the subject.  Minnesota has long maintained a strong 
policy that favors arbitration as a means of resolving labor 
disputes.68  Moreover, Minnesota’s Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) 
makes clear that an arbitrator’s decision can be overturned only on 
exceptional grounds.69  The UAA specifically identifies only five 
narrow reasons that will permit vacating an arbitrator’s award: 
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other 
undue means; 
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed 
 
 65. MINN. STAT. §§ 122A.40, subd. 15(e), 122A.41, subd. 13(e) (2002). 
 66. 304 N.W.2d 338 (Minn. 1981). 
 67. 367 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 68. Jerviss v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 294, 273 N.W.2d 638, 645-46 (Minn. 1978); 
see also Cianflone v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 112, Chaska, 2002 WL 1364247, at *2 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (articulating the deferential standard an arbitrator’s 
decision related to a labor dispute decision is given by the reviewing court). 
 69. MINN. STAT. § 572.19 (2002). 
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as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or 
misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party; 
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; 
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon 
sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to hear 
evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so 
conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of 
section 572.12, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a 
party; or 
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was 
not adversely determined in proceedings under section 
572.09 and the party did not participate in the arbitration 
hearing without raising the objection . . . .70 
The UAA also specifically rejects an arbitrator’s error of fact or 
law as a reason to vacate the award.71  Thus, even “incorrect” 
arbitration awards are understood to be final and binding.72  Very 
few are appealed; virtually none are vacated.  This is yet another 
way by which the 1991 amendments limited the courts’ involvement 
in teacher discharge decisions. 
It was against this backdrop that the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals issued its 2001 decision in the closely watched case of City 
of Brooklyn Center v. Law Enforcement Labor Services, Inc.,73 a decision 
that the Minnesota Supreme Court later declined to review.  
Despite the courts’ long-standing reluctance to review arbitration 
decisions, City of Brooklyn Center is noteworthy because it may have 
altered this presumption, at least in the public sector and perhaps 
in public education.74 
In City of Brooklyn Center, the city had discharged a police 
officer for engaging in a pattern of misconduct against young 
women over a ten-year period.75  The matter went to arbitration 
and the arbitrator found that the police officer had in fact engaged 
in the alleged misconduct.76  In unusually strong language, the 
arbitrator opined that the officer’s conduct was “predatory and 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. City of Brooklyn Ctr. v. Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc., 635 N.W.2d 
236 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), review denied (No. C5-01-414) (Dec. 11, 2001). 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. at 238-40. 
 76. Id. at 240. 
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intolerable” and “may have” violated Minnesota criminal law.77  The 
arbitrator noted that the city had both the legal and moral 
obligation to keep “out of control” police officers like the grievant 
from harassing the public.78  Perhaps most significantly, the 
arbitrator found that if reinstated, the officer would be an 
ineffective officer and an unbelievable witness.79 
Nevertheless, the arbitrator overturned the officer’s 
discharge.80  He did so on the grounds that much of the alleged 
conduct was time-barred for disciplinary purposes and that the 
remaining conduct, while serious, did not warrant outright 
dismissal.81  After expressing the “hope” that the officer would not 
re-offend because he was “passing out of the dating scene,”82 the 
arbitrator reinstated the officer without back pay.83 
The city moved to vacate this decision, arguing that it was 
against public policy and that the arbitrator had exceeded his 
powers.84  After the district court denied that motion, the city 
appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.85  In deciding this 
case, the court reiterated that it favors arbitration and ordinarily 
upholds such awards.86  Nevertheless, the court also recognized that 
public policy may at times require setting aside an arbitration 
award and found this to be one of those cases.87 
The court appears to have reached this determination 
cautiously by repeatedly emphasizing that this holding turned on 
the exceptional facts in this case and should be narrowly 
construed.88  Nevertheless, City of Brooklyn Center now stands for the 
proposition that courts may overturn arbitrators’ awards when (1) 
the labor agreement contains terms that violate public policy, or 
(2) the arbitration award explicitly conflicts with other laws and 
 
 77. Brooklyn Ctr. v. Law Enforcement Labor Servs., BMS Case No. 00-PA-696, 
46 (2000) (S. Bard, Arb.). 
 78. Id. at 43. 
 79. Id. at 50. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. City of Brooklyn Ctr. v. Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc., 635 N.W.2d 
236, 240 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), review denied (No. C5-01-414) (Dec. 11, 2001). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 241. 
 87. Id. at 244. 
 88. Id. 
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legal precedent.89 
It is not entirely clear what this decision means for future 
cases.  In a discussion undoubtedly designed to deflect criticism 
that it was second guessing the arbitrator on the merits, the court 
explained that the relevant consideration was not whether the 
officer’s conduct violated some public policy, but rather whether 
the arbitrator’s decision to reinstate him did so.  To be more 
precise, the court framed the relevant question to be: Did the 
arbitrator’s interpretation of the agreement violate or interfere 
with public policies that require affirmative steps to prevent sexual 
harassment?90  After reviewing the public policy against sexual 
harassment, the court concluded that given the “extreme facts” of 
this “extreme and unique” case the arbitrator’s award did violate 
public policy and must be vacated.91 
In reaching this decision, the court could not have been 
oblivious to the intense interest this matter had generated both 
among members of the general public because of considerable 
media attention, 92 and more specifically within the labor relations 
community.  Thus, it is not surprising that City of Brooklyn Center 
continues to provoke controversy.  One enduring concern is that 
the decision may open the “floodgates” to other appeals of 
arbitration awards.93  The court sought to assuage this concern by 
reiterating the narrow bases upon which it will vacate arbitration 
awards and by emphasizing the exceptional nature of the facts in 
 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. at 242. 
 91. Id. at 244. 
 92. This is certainly not the first time that the arbitration process has come to 
the public’s attention and provoked media examination and criticism.  In 1996, 
the St. Paul Pioneer Press’ series entitled “Firing Public Employees” bemoaned the 
“messy, everyday reality of labor arbitration” and “the consistently difficult and 
unpredictable process through which government managers must attempt to 
discipline or discharge troublesome employees.”  D.J. Tice, Firing Public Employees, 
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 4, 1996, at 10A (noting that most workers who have 
an option chose to appeal their discharges through arbitration). The article 
characterizes as “troubling” the fact that protections developed largely in the 
private sector now comprise “a central influence on the standards to which public 
servants are held.”). See id.  Concerns were raised that arbitrators are “in effect 
empowered to make important public policy through their unguided judgment 
calls,” the policy about standards of conduct that the authors note applies to 
employee groups who hold sensitive positions of public trust, including teachers.  
Id. 
 93. City of Brooklyn Ctr., 635 N.W.2d at 244. 
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this case.94  The court predicted that few, if any, other future cases 
would present such “protracted outrageous behavior by a person 
granted special powers and who is held out by his employer as a 
person whom the public can trust, and who has unique 
opportunities to engage in misconduct.”95  Despite these efforts, 
critics have difficulty viewing this case as anything other than 
second guessing the arbitrator, which is in direct contradiction to 
the UAA’s express rejection of error as a basis for vacating an 
award. 
Thus, questions remain.  Does City of Brooklyn Center actually 
reflect a narrow application of a long-standing rule to particularly 
egregious facts, or does it instead misapply the law regarding 
arbitration awards and public policy so that the “floodgates” are 
now open for appealing unpopular arbitration awards?  Despite the 
court’s efforts to emphasize that its decision “does not threaten the 
general rule regarding arbitration awards,” it is easy to see how it 
may risk doing so for public employees generally and for public 
educators in particular.96  Teachers, like police officers, are persons 
“granted special powers” who are held out “as a person whom the 
public can trust,” and who have “unique opportunities to engage in 
misconduct.”97  It will not be surprising if a school district seeks to 
appeal an arbitrator’s decision that reinstates a teacher whom the 
district alleges poses an ongoing threat in the classroom.  Time will 
tell whether City of Brooklyn Center remains as limited as the court 
intended. 
V. REMEDIATION 
A. Statutory Framework 
As discussed above, two different statutes govern the discharge 
of a non-probationary teacher.98  Teachers employed in 
Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth—the cities of the first class—are 
tenured teachers and their proposed discharges are directed by 
Minnesota Statutes section 122A.41 (Teacher Tenure Act).  
Teachers in all other Minnesota school districts are continuing 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See supra Part II. 
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contract teachers whose proposed discharges are governed by 
Minnesota Statutes section 122A.40 (Continuing Contract Act). 
The two statutes parallel each other in many respects, and 
there is rarely reason for the courts and arbitrators to analyze cases 
brought under them differently.  However, one important 
distinction concerns a continuing contract teacher’s right in many 
cases to be given notice and an opportunity to correct deficiencies 
before being proposed for discharge.  The Teacher Tenure Act 
does not expressly provide tenured teachers with this right.99 
More specifically, the Continuing Contract Act identifies two 
processes for discharging a continuing contract teacher for cause.100  
A district governed by this statute can elect one of two paths upon 
which to proceed.  One path—described in subdivision 9—requires 
the district to first notify the teacher of his or her deficiencies and 
give that teacher a reasonable opportunity to correct them.101  In 
essence, this subdivision specifically focuses on the remediability of 
the teacher’s conduct.102  In contrast, subdivision 13 enumerates 
more serious conduct and permits a district to discharge a tenured 
teacher immediately for such conduct.103  The district is not 
required to give the teacher notice or an opportunity to remedy his 
or her deficient conduct.104  A district that chooses the latter course 
assumes a heavier burden of proof if the action is challenged.105 
In contrast, the statutory provisions that govern the remaining 
school districts—the three cities of the first class (Minneapolis, St. 
Paul, and Duluth)—do not expressly reference giving a teacher the 
opportunity to remedy deficiencies.106  Nevertheless, most court 
and arbitration decisions in which this issue arises suggest that 
unless immediate discharge is warranted pursuant to the statutory 
guidelines, teachers in those cities should also be given notice and 
an opportunity to remedy their deficiencies before being proposed 
for discharge. The decisions that extend this right to “tenured 
teacher” cases, notwithstanding the Teacher Tenure Act’s silence 
on the matter, are probably influenced by both the Continuing 
Contract Act’s specific provisions as well as long-standing and 
 
 99. See MINN. STAT. § 122A.41 (2002). 
 100. See id. § 122A.40 (2002 & Supp. 2003). 
 101. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 9. 
 102. See id. 
 103. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 13. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. § 122A.41. 
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broadly applied general principles of progressive discipline. 
B. Kroll’s Four-Factor Test 
In 1981, the Minnesota Supreme Court provided the most 
definitive statement to date concerning a district’s ability to 
immediately discharge a teacher rather than first provide an 
opportunity to remediate performance or behavior.  In Kroll v. 
Independent School District No. 593, the school board found an 
elementary school teacher’s disciplinary methods to be “cruel, 
excessive, and contrary to the standard of professional conduct 
established for certified classroom teachers” and voted for her 
immediate discharge.107 
The central issue the court faced in Kroll was how to decide 
which termination procedure to follow.108  In this case of first 
impression, the court considered the difference between focusing 
on the “remediability” of a teacher’s conduct versus focusing on its 
“detrimental impact” on the school district.  Specifically, a 
remediability analysis stresses giving a teacher notice of and a 
reasonable time to correct deficient conduct, while a detrimental 
impact analysis gives greater weight to the “severity of the conduct’s 
impact upon the class and the teacher’s ability to teach . . . .” 109 
In Kroll, the court rejected the detrimental impact analysis in 
favor of the remediability approach, concluding that the latter 
“best serves the purpose of the legislature in creating two 
termination procedures.”110  The court found that the legislature 
had intended to balance a school board’s need to make 
discretionary administrative decisions with a teacher’s need to be 
protected from arbitrary dismissals, and concluded that the 
remediability analysis achieved the best balance.111  Therefore, the 
final decision concerning a teacher’s discharge depends a great 
deal upon whether the offensive conduct is remediable.112 
In then considering the standards by which to judge whether 
conduct is remediable, the Minnesota Supreme Court favorably 
cited a test announced in an Illinois Supreme Court case: “[T]he 
test . . . ‘is whether damage has been done to the students, faculty 
 
 107. Kroll v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 593, 304 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. 1981). 
 108. Id. at 345. 
 109. Id. at 344. 
 110. Id. at 345. 
 111. Id. at 344-45. 
 112. Id. at 346. 
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or school, and whether the conduct resulting in that damage could 
have been corrected had the teacher’s superiors warned her.’”113  
Kroll then built upon that test by identifying additional factors that 
must be considered during any termination proceeding.114 
First, “[t]he prior record of a teacher . . . must always be 
considered under either termination procedure.”115  In this case, 
Kroll had a twenty-three-year unblemished record before the single 
incident that led to her dismissal.116  The district’s refusal to 
consider that demonstration of fitness over so many years was 
found to negate any advantage inherent in the tenure system and 
thus, the district did not meet that test.117  Next, the finder of fact 
must consider the severity of the conduct “in light of the teacher’s 
record as a whole.”118  This requires considering whether a 
teacher’s misconduct has been ongoing or whether—as was the 
question in Kroll—a single incident “is so outrageous that it cannot 
be remedied in light of the danger the teacher’s presence in the 
classroom would present.” 119  Third, did the conduct result in 
actual harm or threatened harm?120  Although districts need not 
wait for harm—either physical or psychological harm—to come to 
students before dismissing a teacher, absence of harm should be 
considered in determining whether conduct is remediable.121  
Finally, the fourth factor is “whether the conduct . . . could have 
been corrected had the teacher been warned by superiors.”122 
C. Applying the Four-Factor Test in Kroll 
The facts upon which the district relied in Kroll did not meet 
this four-factor test.  Kroll was a third grade teacher who at the time 
of the incident had served twenty-three years with an unblemished 
record.123  A recent evaluator had noted the atmosphere in her 
classroom was “condusive [sic] to good learning,” and the evaluator 
 
 113. Id. at 345 (quoting Gilliland v. Bd. of Educ. of Pleasant View Consol. Sch. 
Dist. No. 622, 365 N.E.2d 322, 326 (Ill. 1977)). 
 114. Id. at 345-46. 
 115. Id. at 345. 
 116. Id. at 340. 
 117. Id. at 345. 
 118. Id. at 346. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 345. 
 123. Id. at 340. 
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observed that Kroll gave “special attention to a new student 
experiencing adjustment problems.  The teacher is concerned 
about the health and safety of students.”124  It is against this 
backdrop that the critical event occurred. 
On the day in question, Kroll was apparently having discipline 
problems.  After one student denied throwing an object on the 
floor, she told him “to stand beside his desk and extend his arms to 
[his] side in ‘airplane’ fashion.”125  The class then jeered when the 
student failed to keep his arms raised.126  As Kroll returned to her 
desk, she picked up several pins lying in the chalk tray, whereupon 
one of the children cried out, “She has pins!”127  Accounts of what 
happened next differ sharply.128  Although the student and two 
other children testified that Kroll placed a pin approximately one 
inch under each elbow to force the student to hold them straight, 
Kroll testified that she simply pointed with the hand that did not 
have the pins and that the student held his arms out for a very short 
time.129 
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s first challenge was 
to decide whether the evidence supported the school board’s 
findings.130  Then the court had to decide whether the board’s 
decision to terminate Kroll immediately, rather than give her an 
opportunity to correct her behavior, had been “arbitrary, 
unreasonable, or contrary to law.”131  The court’s review of the 
record as a whole convinced it that there was no substantial 
evidence that Kroll had, in fact, held pins under the student’s arms 
to prevent him from lowering them.132  In accepting Kroll’s account 
over the students’, the court acknowledged: 
We do not take our decision regarding the competency 
and probative value of the child testimony lightly.  Often 
student testimony may be the only source of evidence 
contrary to the possibly self-serving explanation from the 
teacher.  However, under these unique facts, when the 
discrepancies in the testimony are both numerous and 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 341. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 342. 
 132. Id. 
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highly variable, reasonable minds cannot rely upon the 
testimony to arrive at a precise conclusion regarding the 
purpose for which appellant was holding pins in her 
hand.133 
Here, the students’ testimony was so “fraught with 
inconsistencies” that it effectively had no probative value.134  It was 
particularly noteworthy that the alleged victim had difficulty 
recalling the incident, and not one student in the class, including 
the victim, had expressed a fear of returning to the classroom or 
had even reported this incident to their parents.135  Thus, the court 
found that to the extent Kroll had done anything wrong, she 
should have been given notice and an opportunity to correct any 
behavior the district found objectionable.136  There was no 
indication that, given a proper warning, she could not have 
adapted her disciplinary approach to fit the district’s unwritten 
policy.137  Accordingly, the court reversed the board’s action and 
directed the district to reinstate Kroll with back pay.138 
D. Applying Kroll’s Four-Factor Test in Other Cases 
An argument can be made that because arbitration proceeding 
are de novo, and because the statutes do not mention the Kroll test, 
arbitrators are not obliged to apply the above standards.  Moreover, 
Kroll was decided under the earlier “substantial evidence” test, 
while arbitrators now apply the “preponderance” test. Nevertheless, 
the reality is that arbitrators have decided, and continue to decide, 
discharge cases under Kroll’s analysis where it applies.  Thus, Kroll 
and the subsequent cases that have applied and further refined the 
Kroll standards remain highly relevant in arbitration. 
Minnesota courts following Kroll had no difficulty upholding 
the immediate discharges of teachers shown to have sexually or 
physically abused students.  For example, in In re Etienne,139 a district 
began termination proceedings after it received a letter from a 
former student twelve years after her graduation alleging she had 
 
 133. Id. at 343. 
 134. Id. at 342. 
 135. Id. at 342-43. 
 136. Id. at 345. 
 137. Id. at 346. 
 138. Id. 
 139. 460 N.W.2d 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
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sexual relations with a teacher while in high school.140  Although 
the hearing examiner recommended that the teacher be issued a 
one-year suspension—presumably because so many years had 
passed—the board rejected that recommendation and terminated 
the teacher effective immediately.141  The court of appeals affirmed 
that decision.142 
Similarly, in 1996 the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a 
teacher’s discharge for improper sexual contact with a student, 
even though the teacher died during the pendency of the appeal.143  
Observing that the case nevertheless involved an “issue of public 
concern that was capable of repetition,” the court refused to 
disturb the findings of fact.144 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals’ widely cited decision in 
Downie v. Independent School District No. 141145 was unique in that it 
upheld a junior high school guidance counselor’s immediate 
discharge on charges other than sexual or physical abuse.  Downie 
was a four-year junior high school guidance counselor with good 
evaluations and no prior discipline when the district immediately 
discharged him on charges of: 
1. [B]eing involved in a weight-loss bet with two ninth-
grade female students, the terms of which included sexual 
activities with Downie; 
2. [T]elling two male teachers in the teachers’ lounge 
about entering into the bet; 
3. [S]ending a handwritten note to a ninth-grade female 
student which stated: “Stay out of my fucking business;” 
4. [R]epeatedly administering an oral survey to individuals 
and groups of junior high school students regarding their 
personal sexual activities; 
5. [U]sing vulgar, crude, and inappropriate language and 
stories when speaking to students; 
6. [S]exually harassing staff and students by making 
inappropriate remarks and staring at their bodies; and 
7. [B]reaching the confidentiality of students whom he 
 
 140. Id. at 110. 
 141. Id. at 111. 
 142. Id. at 110. 
 143. Falgren v. State Bd. of Teaching, 545 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1996). 
 144. Id. at 903. 
 145. 367 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
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counseled.146 
The court of appeals found that these were sufficient grounds 
to support Downie’s immediate discharge.147  After first noting and 
adopting the hearing examiner’s detailed explanation why the 
allegations were true, the court highlighted one feature of the case 
that it deemed particularly important: 
Downie was a junior high school counselor who counseled 
students on a one-to-one basis. His was in a very influential 
and sensitive position.  Because of his role as counselor, 
students confided in Downie to a much greater extent 
than they would in a teacher of English or math.  The 
potential for students to be greatly harmed or greatly 
aided by their relationship with Downie was substantial. 
His impact on the lives of impressionable young people of 
junior high school age was great.  Arguably, he should be 
held to an even greater standard of care and sensitivity 
than teachers in other disciplines.148 
It is noteworthy that the court found the counselor’s breach of 
confidence to be even more serious than his sexual bantering with 
the students: 
We find particularly offensive Downie’s disclosure of an 
incest victim’s confidences to teachers in a social setting 
who had no compelling professional need for such 
information.  The school nurse’s testimony supports that 
such a disclosure could have devastating psychological 
consequences for the victim should she ever discover that 
Downie made such a disclosure.  Furthermore, the record 
supports that such breaches of the confidential 
relationship between counselee and counselor were not 
uncommon for Downie.  Testimony indicates that some 
teachers even stopped referring students to Downie due 
to their concerns regarding his professional competency 
and ethics.149 
In summary, it is clear from Kroll and Downie that districts that 
attempt to immediately discharge a teacher, instead of first giving 
the teacher notice and an opportunity to improve, face demanding 
standards of proof.  Those standards are most easily met when 
there is proof of sexual contact or physical abuse.  However, Downie 
 
 146. Id. at 915. 
 147. Id. at 918. 
 148. Id. at 917. 
 149. Id. at 917-18. 
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demonstrates that other conduct, if sufficiently egregious, can also 
meet that burden. 
E. Remediation Details 
Broad pronouncements that a teacher should be given an 
opportunity to remedy deficient performance do not address 
several concrete questions that surround this prerequisite to 
discharge.  Questions include: What qualifies as a remediation 
plan, and how is one to be implemented?  For example, sometimes 
the parties disagree whether a teacher was given remedial 
opportunities in the first place. This presents a different question 
than determining whether a teacher has successfully corrected 
identified deficiencies. 
A recent arbitration involving the proposed discharge of a St. 
Paul elementary teacher presented this issue squarely to the 
arbitrator.150  When the teacher protested her discharge, in part 
because the district had not given her a formal Performance 
Improvement Plan (PIP), the superintendent responded to that 
argument with two assertions of her own.151 First, the 
superintendent testified that PIPs are designed to improve teaching 
effectiveness in the classroom.152  PIPs do not address matters of 
mistreatment of students or tardiness or insubordination, and are 
not necessary prerequisites to discharging a teacher for personal 
misconduct.153  The superintendent testified that here the bases for 
discharge—inappropriate student discipline, excessive tardiness 
and insubordination—were all-or-nothing matters for which there 
is no such thing as gradual improvement.154  Second, the 
superintendent pointed to the countless directives and discipline 
issued to the teacher over many years and argued that, in any event, 
those did constitute a performance improvement plan.155  They had 
informed the teacher of the district’s expectations of her 
performance and provided a measure by which to ultimately 
conclude she would not or could not meet those expectations.156  
 
 150. Barnes-Griswold v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, St. Paul, BMS Case No. 03-
TD-6 (2003) (Ver Ploeg, Arb.). 
 151. Id. at 21-22. 
 152. Id. at 21. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 22. 
 156. Id. 
25
Ver Ploeg: Terminating Public School Teachers for Cause Under Minnesota Law
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
VERPLOEG(LS &CB).DOC 10/3/2004  9:42:09 PM 
328 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1 
The arbitrator accepted both arguments, concluding that the 
school district had met its burden of proving proper discharge of 
the teacher.157 
Another issue surrounding the question of remediation 
concerns the number of times a teacher must be given an 
opportunity to remedy his or her deficiencies.  In 2002, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals provided some helpful guidance on 
this question in Cianflone  v. Independent School District No. 112.158  In 
Cianflone, the Chaska School District had suspended an elementary 
school music teacher in 1993 “for making unacceptable physical 
contact with students and using inappropriate and demeaning 
methods of discipline.”159  An arbitrator upheld the ten-day 
suspension and affirmed a board directive that prohibited the 
teacher “from touching students, from allowing his anger to affect 
his interaction with students, and from making any statements to 
students that could be reasonably interpreted as threats.”160 
The next five years passed without incident.161  However, in 
early 1998, two incidents occurred.162  In February, the teacher 
“shouted ‘shut up already’ at two disruptive students and threw a 
hand drum across the room for what he characterized as ‘dramatic 
effect.’”163  Two months later, as the teacher took a disruptive 
student by the arm and escorted him to the principal’s office, the 
classroom door swung shut and made contact with both student 
and teacher.164 
Based upon these two incidents, the school board proposed to 
terminate the teacher’s employment as of June 1998.165  After a five-
day hearing, the arbitrator found that the conduct was not 
sufficiently severe to warrant termination under Minnesota Statutes 
section 125.12, subdivision 8,166 the immediate discharge section, 
but did uphold the termination under subdivision 6167 on the 
 
 157. Id. at 24. 
 158. No. CX-01-2269, 2002 WL 1364247 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 159. Id. at *1. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id.  See MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 8 (1996) (now codified at MINN. STAT. 
§ 122A.40, subd. 13 (2002)). 
 167. Cianflone, 2002 WL 1364247, at *1.  The court of appeals upheld the 
termination under Minnesota Statutes section 125.12, subdivision 6 (1996) (now 
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grounds that the teacher had engaged in a persistent pattern of 
inappropriate behavior.168 
In attempting to overturn that decision, the teacher argued 
that the arbitrator had exceeded his power because he denied the 
teacher his subdivision 6 right to an opportunity to correct any 
deficiency.169  However, the court rejected that argument, finding 
that the board’s 1993 directive had given the teacher five years to 
do so.170  The Court noted that if, as the teacher asserted, a district 
“was required to wait a reasonable time after every additional 
deficiency occurred, no teacher could ever be terminated for 
improper conduct.”171 
Other interesting questions can arise when remediation plans 
contain counseling requirements.  Arbitrators who issue such 
directives in education and other labor cases often fail to identify 
which party must assume that expense.  However, in 2002 
Arbitrator Olson reduced a proposed immediate discharge to a 
one-semester suspension, while also directing a “remediation plan 
that includes psychological evaluation and counseling by a 
qualified professional of the District’s choosing and at the teacher’s 
expense.”172  Another difficult question is who decides whether 
such counseling has been successful. 
VI. BASES FOR DISCHARGE 
A. Statutory Overview 
Districts that attempt to discharge a teacher (or, in the case of 
a city of the first class, discharge or demote) can do so only upon 
evidence of deficient performance or personal behavior that fits 
within categories identified within the pertinent statute. The 
Teacher Tenure Act lists “grounds for discharge or demotion” 
within a single provision173 that is sufficiently general to embrace 
virtually any type of professional or personal conduct.  Similarly, 
 
codified at MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 9 (2002)).  Id. at *1. 
 168. Id. at *1. 
 169. Id. at *3. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Educ. Minn. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 622, N. St. Paul-Maplewood-Oakdale, 
BMS Case No. 02-TD-8, 13 (2002) (Olson, Arb.). 
 173. MINN. STAT. § 122A.41, subd. 6 (2002). 
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the Continuing Contract Act lists categories broad enough to 
embrace almost all conduct perceived as detrimental to the 
educational process.174  The Continuing Contract Act is noteworthy 
in that the statute is further divided into two different provisions.175 
Subdivision 9 of the Continuing Contract Act, which applies to 
continuing contract teachers, identifies four broad categories of 
deficiency: inefficiency, neglect of duty, unbecoming conduct, and 
“other good and sufficient grounds.”176  A district that attempts to 
discharge a continuing contract teacher pursuant to this provision 
cannot do so unless it has first given the teacher notice of his or her 
deficiencies and a reasonable plan and time-frame within which to 
remedy them.177  As was discussed in the preceding section, a 
district can discharge a teacher only upon showing that it made 
these efforts and that these efforts have failed.178  Even then, the 
district can propose the teacher’s discharge only at the end of the 
school year and only after meeting the Continuing Contract Act’s 
April 1 deadline for completing the entire process of discharge: 
giving notice and opportunity to remedy, notice of hearing and 
hearing, and receipt of final decision.179 
In contrast, subdivision 13 identifies separate bases to support 
the immediate discharge of a teacher. 180  Those grounds generally 
parallel those in subdivision 9, but they address more serious forms 
of that conduct.181  For example, the subdivision 9 reference to 
inefficiency becomes “gross” inefficiency under subdivision 13.182  
Similarly, neglect of duty provides the basis for a section 13 
immediate discharge only if it is “willful.”183  Other conduct that 
warrants immediate discharge includes immoral conduct, serious 
insubordination, a felony conviction, unbecoming conduct that 
requires immediate removal from the classroom, failure to teach, 
and a twelve-month disability.184 
 
 174. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 9. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See supra Part V. 
 179. MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 16 (2002). 
 180. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 13 (emphasis added). 
 181. Compare MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 9 (2002), with MINN. STAT. § 
122A.40, subd. 13 (2002). 
 182. Compare MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 9 (2002), with MINN. STAT. § 
122A.40, subd. 13 (2002). 
 183. MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 13 (2002). 
 184. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 9. 
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Regardless of whether the path a district takes to propose 
discharge follows remediation efforts or immediate discharge, 
challenges require arbitrator to review the record as a whole to 
determine whether the district has (1) met its burden of proving 
the conduct complained of actually occurred, and (2) 
demonstrated that the proven conduct has been sufficiently 
egregious to discharge the teacher either immediately after the 
hearing185 or effective at the end of the school year.186 
Some conduct is so outrageous that if the fact of its occurrence 
is not challenged, then no one would seriously question the 
teacher’s removal from the classroom.  However, those cases rarely 
go to hearing.  Rather, such cases are often resolved quietly in ways 
that the teacher, represented by Education Minnesota, and the 
district agree are in everyone’s best interests.  Cases that do go to 
hearing and thus become a matter of public record are typically the 
problematic cases for which the statutory guidelines provide little 
clear guidance. 
The following discharge cases are grouped into those that 
involve issues of performance and those that involve personal 
behavior.  Performance-based discharges and demotions typically 
use the statutory terminology of failure to teach,187 inefficiency in 
teaching or school management,188 or neglect of duty,189 and almost 
always include allegations that the teacher was given notice and an 
opportunity to improve performance but failed to do so.  In 
contrast, discharges or demotions based on a teacher’s personal 
behavior are typically characterized by the statutory terms “immoral 
character” or “conduct unbecoming a teacher”190 and have less 
often involved remediation efforts.  In addition, to the extent that 
the preceding categories might fail to embrace the conduct 
complained of, a district not of the first class can seek to discharge 
a non-probationary teacher based upon the Act’s catch-all phrase: 
“other good and sufficient grounds” that render the teacher unfit 
to perform his or her duties.191 
The following discussion explores these two broad categories.  
 
 185. See id. §§ 122A.40, subd. 13; 122A.41, subd. 4. 
 186. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 9. 
 187. See id. §§ 122A.40, subd. 13(a)(3); 122A.41, subd. 6(a)(2). 
 188. See id. §§ 122A.40, subd. 9(a); 122A.41, subd. 6(a)(3). 
 189. See id. § 122A.40, subd. 9(b), subd. 13(a)(5) (2002). 
 190. See id. §§ 122A.40, subds. 9(c), 13(a)(1)-(2); 122A.41, subd. 6(a)(1). 
 191. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 9(d). 
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In addition, it also examines cases that involve a teacher’s inability 
to teach because of licensure issues or health and disability reasons. 
B. Professional Performance 
Despite the broad reach of the statutory categories, recorded 
cases reveal a few recurring types of performance-related 
allegations that have caused districts to propose a teacher’s 
discharge.  The following three cases illustrate several of the most 
common performance-based themes. 
1. Performance in the Classroom 
In 1981, the Minnesota Supreme Court examined issues of 
teacher performance in Ganyo v. Independent School District No. 
832.192  Ganyo involved a high school teacher with seventeen years in 
the district, plus eight years previous teaching experience, who 
received a notice of deficiency after her assistant principal and 
assistant superintendent evaluated her and identified two incidents 
that allegedly demonstrated ineffective communication with 
students’ parents.193  The notice of deficiency identified eight 
concerns and specifically directed Ganyo as to how she was to 
correct those behaviors.194  For example, with respect to her “lack of 
clear directions to the students,” she was instructed that 
[v]erbal directions should be given slowly and clearly.  
Long and complex directions are to be avoided.  Written 
directions, whether on the blackboard or on paper should 
be clear, neat, concise and grammatically correct.  You 
should make sure each direction has been understood 
before proceeding with the lesson.195 
The seven other areas of deficiency, all of which were also 
accompanied by specific directives, were: classroom control, 
listening, record keeping, parent communications, instructional 
criteria and student evaluations, discussion of personal matters, 
and relations with staff and supervisors.196 
The assistant principal who issued the notice of deficiency on 
January 2, 1979 told the teacher that she would be expected to 
 
 192. 311 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. 1981). 
 193. See id. at 498. 
 194. Id. at 498-99. 
 195. Id. at 498. 
 196. Id. at 498-99. 
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show improvement during a second round of formal observations 
on February 1, 1979.197  The assistant principal did observe Ganyo 
twice in her classroom in early February.198  On February 26, 1979, 
the school board passed a resolution proposing her discharge 
effective at the end of the school year.199  That resolution classified 
the eight areas listed in the notice of deficiency as: “[i]nefficiency, 
neglect of duty, persistent violation of school rules, regulations and 
directives, and other good and sufficient grounds rendering you 
unfit to perform your duties.”200  Ganyo requested and was given a 
hearing before the school board at the end of March 1979.201  
Immediately after that hearing, the board met for forty-five minutes 
and passed a motion to terminate her at the end of the school year 
based upon the recited deficiencies (except for the charge of 
inadequate record keeping, which was stricken).202 
Ganyo appealed the board’s decision to the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, which reviewed the evidence and concluded that 
the record contained “little probative evidence to substantiate that 
each of the alleged deficiencies existed or was not cured.”203  The 
court reached this conclusion despite its assurance that it does not 
set aside board decisions to terminate unless they are “fraudulent, 
arbitrary, unreasonable, not supported by substantial evidence on 
the record, not within the school board’s jurisdiction or . . . based 
on an erroneous theory of law.” 204  The court’s explanation of why 
the evidence in this case was not worthy of the deference typically 
given to board decisions serves as a helpful guide in designing and 
implementing a fair process in other cases. 
First, it is apparent that the court expected the district to 
support its allegations of unsatisfactory teaching performance with 
more than a single supervisor’s observations.  In this case, only the 
assistant principal observed Ganyo’s teaching before and after the 
notice of deficiency.205 Although the court stopped short of 
requiring that districts use more than one evaluator, it not so subtly 
 
 197. Id. at 498. 
 198. Id. at 499. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 499-500. 
 203. Id. at 500. 
 204. Id.  See also Kroll v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 593, 304 N.W.2d 338, 342 (Minn. 
1981). 
 205. Ganyo, 311 N.W.2d at 500. 
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observed that “the severity of termination for a tenured teacher 
suggests that such a course would be wise.”206  This is especially true 
where, as it appeared here, the teacher was in fact making efforts 
and had improved in several areas.207 
Furthermore, the court found that the record failed to 
demonstrate “substantial evidence” of poor teaching performance 
given the assistant principal’s acknowledgement that Ganyo had 
improved with respect to two of the charges against her and the 
fact that the district had dropped another charge before the 
hearing.208  It was noteworthy that the final record cited only two 
alleged incidents concerning parental communication, neither of 
which seemed particularly blameworthy.209  As for Ganyo’s alleged 
resistance to criticism and supervision from the administration, the 
court found that 
the English Department as a whole had a problem in 
dealing with one administrator, and that Ganyo, as a long-
term tenured teacher reacted in an understandably 
defensive manner to a deficiency notice which she neither 
understood nor felt was warranted.  The record indicates 
that Ganyo was making efforts to improve her teaching; 
she had improved in several areas by her own testimony 
and by that of students and her supervisor, Moran.210 
Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court ordered Ganyo reinstated 
and compensated for her lost wages.211 
One year after Ganyo, the court reached a different conclusion 
concerning a teacher’s performance in Whaley v. Anoka-Hennepin 
Independent School District No. 11.212  Before his discharge, Whaley 
“had served for nineteen consecutive years as a teacher and a 
principal in the . . .  [d]istrict, the last three of these years as a 
reading teacher [in the elementary school].”213  In May 1980, the 
district gave him a notice of deficiency, which supplemented a 
similar notice he had been given two years earlier.214  The May 1980 
notice alleged the following deficiencies: (1) poor rapport with 
 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 501. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 502. 
 212. 325 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 1982). 
 213. Id. at 129. 
 214. Id. 
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students; (2) insufficient communications with parents and fellow 
staff members; (3) inappropriate use of class time; (4) failure to be 
punctual or appear at appointments; (5) failure to follow the 
school board’s adopted reading program; (6) irrational grading of 
students; and  (7) lack of student progress.215 
The following school year, administrators observed Whaley’s 
classroom performance on six separate occasions between 
September and January, and the administrators met with him to 
apprise him of his teaching performance.216  Despite these efforts, 
that February the board—presumably having concluded that 
Whaley could not or would not improve his performance—issued 
him a notice of proposed termination.217  After a hearing before the 
board, presided over by a hearing officer, Whaley appealed his 
discharge and the district court reinstated him.218  The district court 
found that there was no evidence that Whaley’s frequent use of 
worksheets had adversely affected his students and there was no 
evidence that his disciplinary methods were inappropriate.219 
The school district then appealed the case to the Minnesota 
Supreme Court.220  In undertaking this review the court reiterated 
its limited role in reviewing board decisions: 
When deciding whether to hire or to terminate a teacher, 
a board of education is acting in an administrative 
capacity.  On appeal to this court, a school board’s 
decision to terminate a teacher will be set aside only if the 
decision is “fraudulent, arbitrary, unreasonable, not 
supported by substantial evidence on the record, not 
within the school board’s jurisdiction, or is based on an 
erroneous theory of law.” 221 
However, the court made it clear that although it accepted a 
limited judicial role vis-à-vis a board’s fact finding processes,222 it did 
not similarly defer to trial court determinations.223  In reversing the 
 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 129-30. 
 217. Id. at 130. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 129-31. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 130 (citing Ganyo v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 832, 311 N.W.2d 497, 500 
(Minn. 1981)). 
 222. Id. at 130-31 (citing Anderson v. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 144, 196 Minn. 
256, 257-58, 264 N.W. 784, 784-85 (1936)).   Cf. City of N. St. Paul v. Minn. Water 
Res. Bd., 260 N.W.2d 584, 586-87 (Minn. 1977). 
 223. The court stated that it “owes no deference to the trial court’s 
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district court’s findings in favor of Whaley, the court found 
“substantial evidence in the record” of four major deficiencies that 
justified his discharge.224 
First, the Minnesota Supreme Court shared the school 
district’s concern that Whaley had used worksheets in the 
classroom more often and more extensively than other instructors, 
and that this had caused much student confusion and frustration.225  
An outside instruction consultant who had visited the classroom 
confirmed the school principal’s testimony that Whaley used 
worksheets so much that it produced a poor learning environment 
and inhibited student progress.226 
Because this discharge was brought under statutory provisions 
that first called for notice and an opportunity to correct behavior,227 
it can be assumed that Whaley had been told to alter his use of the 
worksheets but had failed to do so.  Whether this issue alone would 
have warranted Whaley’s discharge is unclear.  The court’s 
surprisingly strong assertion that Whaley had “used worksheets 
improperly and to such excess that it justified the termination of 
his contract . . . .” 228 suggests that this allegation in and of itself 
could have supported discharge.  However, the court then 
tempered this observation by noting that its holding in the district’s 
favor relied not only on “the probative force of this evidence” (the 
worksheet allegation), but also the “related evidence through the 
record.”229  Thus, this tantalizing question remains unresolved. 
Next, the court observed that the evidence that Whaley’s 
students had failed to make appropriate progress was “the most 
closely related to the statutory grounds for discharge and the most 
 
determination.”  Kroll v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 593, 304 N.W.2d 338, 342 (Minn. 
1981).   “Because this court conducts an independent review of the entire record 
before the School Board without according deference to the same review 
conducted by the court below, the question of whether the District Court utilized 
the correct standard of review has no bearing on our disposition of this matter.”  
Whaley, 325 N.W.2d at 130 (citing Urban Council on Mobility v. Minn. Dept. of 
Natural Res., 289 N.W.2d 729, 732-33 (Minn. 1980); Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 
256 N.W.2d 808, 824 (Minn. 1977)). 
 224. Whaley, 325 N.W.2d at 131. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 9 (2002).  The Whaley court cited to the 
formerly codified version at MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 6 (1980)).  Whaley, 325 
N.W.2d at 131. 
 228. Whaley, 325 N.W.2d at 131. 
 229. Id. 
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clearly supported by substantial evidence in the record.”230  
Administrators had reached this conclusion based upon in-class 
observations and student performance on district-wide skills, tests, 
and worksheets.231  They also considered evaluations of a reading 
curriculum consultant and three other teachers who reviewed the 
records or worked with the students and found that the students 
had not made satisfactory progress.232  In contrast, no teachers 
testified on Whaley’s behalf, although a few students did testify that 
they were satisfied with their progress.233  Agreeing that students 
had made unsatisfactory progress because of Whaley’s poor 
teaching performance, the court found that “lack of student 
progress is sufficient to trigger the grounds for discharge under 
[the terms of the statute].” 234 
With these findings, the court did not then discuss the 
evidence concerning the remaining two of the four major 
deficiencies it had cited: the teacher’s lack of rapport with students 
and his lack of appropriate student discipline.235  Apparently, the 
two deficiencies that the court did comment upon, particularly the 
evidence of lack of student progress, were so compelling that the 
court found it unnecessary to bolster what it had already 
determined was “substantial evidence on the record” to uphold the 
discharge.236 
Whaley may be thought of as a forerunner of the heightened 
attention that has more recently been given to assessing teacher 
competencies.  In the past, teacher competence assessments had 
largely been confined to new or prospective teachers.  Districts that 
have attempted to discharge veteran teachers based upon 
allegations of unsatisfactory student performance have often been 
stymied by the courts’ reluctance to link student progress and 
teacher behavior because of the difficulty, even impossibility, of 
isolating a teacher’s performance from the many other variables 
that affect learning and over which a teacher has no control.237 
 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 130. 
 236. Id. 
 237. For example, in Peter W. v. S. F. Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 
861 (Ct. App. 1976) the court observed: 
Substantial professional authority attests that the achievement of literacy 
35
Ver Ploeg: Terminating Public School Teachers for Cause Under Minnesota Law
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
VERPLOEG(LS &CB).DOC 10/3/2004  9:42:09 PM 
338 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1 
Thus, Whaley is open to criticism from those who question 
whether teachers should ever be discharged because of their 
students’ performances.  Others who might be willing to link 
student progress to questions of competence may also question this 
decision because the district had not established any specific 
standards concerning teacher performance against which Whaley 
could be assessed; there was only evidence that his students did not 
measure up to other students.238  There is also concern that the 
index used to make that determination appears to have been 
subjective.  In any event, Whaley appears unique in its acceptance of 
generalized charges of incompetence, such as poor teaching 
results, limited pupil progress, and slow progress. 
Turning to arbitration, the following case provides an 
interesting contrast to the preceding judicial decisions.  In 
Zwaschka v. Independent School District No. 84, Sleepy Eye,239 a special 
education teacher who had been with the district for over twenty 
years was proposed for discharge based on allegations that included 
his failure to comply with the due process requirements of 
students’ individual education plans (IEPs).240  The teacher’s 
negligence was described as “pervasive, persistent, and 
numerous.”241  In fact, one person who reviewed the records was 
quoted as saying, “[T]his was way beyond the most severe, the 
deepest, the largest, the most enormous mess they had ever seen, 
way beyond anything they had ever been involved in . . . . The 
problem was profound.” 242  The district alleged that Zwaschka’s 
failure to complete the IEPs had resulted in its forfeiting federal 
money for seven students and had put it at significant risk of 
liability under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.243 
Although Arbitrator Olson agreed that the evidence supported 
discipline, she identified two reasons why the district did not have 
just cause to discharge.  First, she was persuaded that the district 
 
in the schools, or its failure, are influenced by a host of factors which 
affect the pupil subjectively, from outside the formal teaching process, 
and beyond the control of its ministers.  They may be physical, 
neurological, emotional, cultural, environmental; they may be present 
but not perceived, recognized but not identified. 
 238. Whaley, 325 N.W.2d at 128. 
 239. BMS Case No. 99-TD-6 (1999) (Olson, Arb.). 
 240. Id. at 3. 
 241. Id. at 13. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
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itself was dilatory in meeting the special education standards and 
that “this inequitable treatment should tend to soften the severity 
with which Zwaschka’s conduct was judged.”244  Disparate treatment 
is a well-accepted basis for overturning otherwise appropriate 
discipline, and in this case Arbitrator Olson concluded that “[i]f 
the district holds the standard of complete, current IEPs to one 
teacher’s conduct, that standard must also be held against the 
district.”245  Second, Olson found it “[e]qually curious” that the 
school district, in effect the high school principal, had long known 
about the teacher’s lagging paperwork yet had done nothing about 
it.246  Despite the district’s assertion that “[w]e try to track down 
anything that appears out of the usual,” no one had approached 
the teacher to help or to warn him.247  Thus, the district was once 
again found not to have come to the hearing with “clean hands,” 
and therefore could not use a standard in one instance that it 
ignored in another.248 
Another matter of concern to school districts, and ultimately 
to the courts and the arbitrators, is the issue of student discipline.  
In 1974, the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed a case in which a 
seven-year elementary education teacher was discharged based on 
her “inability to maintain consistent discipline and appropriate 
rapport necessary in teaching children.”249  In reinstating the 
teacher to her position, the court noted that during the teacher’s 
previous seven years with the district she had “practically no 
problems with discipline and no other teaching problems of 
note.”250  While acknowledging that immediately before her 
discharge the teacher had encountered many discipline problems, 
the court also observed that “[i]t also seems clear that some parents 
were looking for something to complain about.”251  From these 
observations, it is apparent that the courts will be skeptical of 
allegations raised for the first time well into a teacher’s long and 
previously unblemished career. 
 
 244. Id. at 27. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 28. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Hardy v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 694, 301 Minn. 373, 374, 223 N.W.2d 124, 
125 (1974). 
 250. Id. at 376, 223 N.W.2d at 127. 
 251. Id. at 377, 223 N.W.2d at 127. 
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2. Licensure Issues 
Discharging a teacher whose licensing status prevents him or 
her from teaching raises related performance questions.  Two 
arbitration cases that preceded the discharge of a Lake Benton 
teacher illustrate the complicated issues that can arise.  In the first 
arbitration, Arbitrator Olson weighed the evidence concerning 
allegations of child abuse and reduced the teacher’s ninety-day 
suspension to a sixty-day suspension.252  After serving this 
suspension, the teacher returned to the classroom.253  However, 
because of the nature of these charges, Minnesota law required the 
district to report the matter to the State Board of Teaching.254  In 
turn, the Board of Teaching notified the teacher on December 15, 
1999, that on December 10 it had suspended her license until 
August 5, 2000.255 
The teacher, who had known of the state board’s pending 
action and that it would mean she could no longer legally teach, 
stopped coming to school on December 10.256 However, her 
attorney did not explain her absence to the superintendent until 
receiving the formal suspension notice from the Board of Teaching 
on December 15.257  Based upon this information, the school board 
proposed the teacher’s immediate discharge.258  The notice cited 
the statutory grounds of insubordination, failure without justifiable 
cause to teach without first securing a written release of the school 
board, and willful neglect of duty.259  In addition, the notice 
described the factual basis for the action: 
Suspension of your teaching license from December 10, 
1999, to August 15, 2000, by the Board of Teaching (as 
evidenced by the attached Stipulation Agreement), 
making it impossible for you to fulfill your teaching duties 
and resulting in the School District having to hire another 
teacher to replace you.260 
 
 252. Educ. Minn. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 404, Lake Benton, BMS Case No. 99-
PA-1050, 2 (1999) (Olson, Arb.). 
 253. Christenson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 404, Lake Benton, BMS Case No. 00-
TD-3, 2 (2000) (Ver Ploeg, Arb.). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 3-4. 
 256. Id. at 4. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
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At the second arbitration, this dispute presented the rather 
technical question: Whether Minnesota law—with its “cause” 
requirement for discharge—applied to licensure questions such as 
this and, if so, whether the district had proven that such cause 
existed.261  This case also presented a very human dilemma in that 
the teacher was now losing her job for conduct that neither the 
school district nor Arbitrator Olson had ever viewed as supporting 
discharge.262 
Although the outcome in this case was “deeply troubling,” the 
arbitrator who presided over the discharge hearing was unable to 
find that the district had either a legal or a contract obligation to 
ameliorate that harsh result in order to preserve an employment 
relationship in which the teacher was legally unable to uphold her 
end of the bargain.263  Looking beyond the Continuing Contract 
Act, the arbitrator concluded that when the teacher lost her 
teaching license, albeit temporarily, by law she became 
“unqualified” to teach.264  The arbitrator could not distinguish this 
situation from the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision in 
Schumacher v. Independent School District No. 25,265 a 1990 case in 
which a teacher’s teaching contract was found to have been void at 
the time it was signed because he did not have a Minnesota 
teaching license before he began teaching.  Just as Schumacher 
had “no right to entitlement to continued employment,”266 in the 
Lake Benton case the arbitrator found that when this teacher 
became unable to fulfill her responsibilities in the employment 
relationship, her teaching contract became void.267  Thus, the 
district had no obligation to undertake unilateral efforts to 
preserve her job throughout her suspension.268 
In contrast, in an arbitration involving the Red Lake School 
District, the board proposed the superintendent for immediate 
 
 261. Id. at 8. 
 262. Id. at 12. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 9. 
 265. No. CX-90-1233, 1990 WL 163042 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
 266. Id. at * 2. 
 267. Christenson, BMS Case No. 00-TD-3 at 12. 
 268. Id. at 10.  In addition, the arbitrator agreed with the district that even if a 
“cause” standard were applied to this case under the Continuing Contract Act, 
there was cause to immediately discharge a teacher who was shown unable to teach 
“without justifiable cause without first securing the written release of the school 
board.”  Id. 
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discharge on the grounds that he had failed to renew his five-year 
license.269  Arbitrator Reynolds reinstated the superintendent based 
upon evidence that the lapse had been inadvertent.270  It had lapsed 
at a time when the superintendent thought he was going to be 
retiring, and he had re-instated it prior to his discharge.271  
Moreover, it was significant that the superintendent had never 
misrepresented the situation.272 
Similarly, Arbitrator Gallagher rejected an argument that a 
teacher had been insubordinate in failing to obtain a license to 
teach in the area for which she had been hired.273  He reinstated 
the teacher based upon the fact that the teacher was licensed in 
other subject areas, although not in the area where she had been 
teaching under a one year variance.274 
C. Personal Behavior 
While the preceding cases have explored questions of a 
teacher’s professional competence and its effect on the educational 
process, another even larger group of cases involves a teacher’s 
personal behavior both at and away from school.  The line between 
these two categories of cases is often unclear.  Certainly personal 
behavior can have a direct impact upon the educational process, 
and questions of professional competence sometimes stem from 
personal difficulties.  Moreover, notices of proposed discharges 
often contain multiple charges that incorporate criticisms of both 
professional competence and personal behavior.  Nevertheless, for 
purposes of this examination, the following cases are used to 
explore more personal conduct, such as insubordination, 
dishonesty, and both verbally and physically abusive behavior. 
1. High Standard of Conduct 
In embarking upon this examination it is important to 
recognize that Minnesota courts and arbitrators, like much of 
society, tend to hold teachers to a high standard of conduct.  
 
 269. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 38, Red Lake v. Kroenke, BMS Case No. 95-VP-342, 
4-5 (1994) (Reynolds, Arb.). 
 270. Id. at 12. 
 271. Id. at 4-5. 
 272. Id. at 9. 
 273. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 284, Wayzata v. Minn. Educ. Ass’n, BMS Case No. 03-
TD-5, 16-17 (2002) (Gallagher, Arb.). 
 274. Id. 
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Arbitrator Miller spoke for many when he explained: 
There is no doubt . . . that a teacher is placed in a position 
of great responsibility by the District.  The citizens of the 
District place their faith and trust in this teacher to 
nurture their children academically while at the same 
time safeguarding their physical and mental well-being.  
Thus, society has traditionally set high standards of moral 
and legal behavior for teachers, often higher than in 
other professional settings.  On one hand, the teacher 
who fulfills these responsibilities rightfully earns the 
admiration and respect of the District, students, parents, 
and community.  On the other hand, the teacher who 
abuses this trust by having sex with a student while in 
school deserves not only scorn but swift removal from his 
position.275 
This widely accepted view provides an important backdrop for 
the following cases. 
2. Illustrative Cases 
Minnesota law recognizes insubordination as a specific ground 
for termination,276 and insubordinate behavior also easily falls 
within the statutory categories of “conduct unbecoming a 
teacher”277 and “other good and sufficient grounds.”278  In the case 
of Ray v. Minneapolis Board of Education, Special School District No. 1,279 
the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the decision of appellant 
school district, which found that a tenured teacher’s refusal to 
participate in a review of the district’s educational program 
constituted insubordination for which he could be discharged.280  
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that there is no 
Minnesota statutory or common law definition of insubordination 
and adopted the definition upon which the parties had agreed: 
“Insubordination is a constant or continuing intentional refusal to 
obey a direct or implied order, reasonable in nature, and given by 
and with proper authority.”281 Applying this definition, the court 
 
 275. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 741, Paynesville v. Minn. Educ. Ass’n & Brad 
Hanson, BMS Case No. 94-TD-12, 37 (1994) (Miller, Arb.). 
 276. MINN. STAT. §§ 122A.40, subd. 13(1), 122A.41, subd. 6(1) (2002). 
 277. See id. §§ 122A.40, subds. 9(c), 13(2), 122A.41, subd. 6(1). 
 278. See id. § 122A.40, subd. 9(d). 
 279. 295 Minn. 13, 202 N.W.2d 375 (1972). 
 280. Id. at 378. 
 281. Id. 
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found that “[t]here is no question but that appellant had ample 
opportunity to fill out the evaluation forms and that his responses 
were purposely and intentionally incomplete, uncooperative, 
unresponsive, and argumentative.”282 
Discharges based upon claims of insubordination typically 
involve teachers who refuse bona fide orders from management or 
otherwise challenge management’s proper exercise of its authority.  
The general principle of “work now, grieve later,” which is so 
central in the broader arena of labor relations, also applies in 
education.  A charge of insubordination requires proof that the 
directive at issue was clear and that it was reasonable.283  A 1994 
decision by Arbitrator Flagler provides an interesting illustration of 
a proposed discharge that failed because of these requirements.284 
In Arbitrator Flagler’s case, the Eden Prairie School District 
argued that the teacher had been insubordinate when he failed to 
refrain from physical contact with students as directed.285  However, 
the evidence failed to prove an essential underlying element: that 
the teacher had been given clear and effective notice of the 
behaviors he was directed to avoid or correct.286  For example, when 
the teacher asked the principal what he was doing wrong, he was 
told in effect that “if you don’t already know, I can’t tell you.”287  
Flagler was also willing to take “arbitral notice,” based upon his own 
many years of experience in education, that it is virtually impossible 
to obey a directive to avoid physical contact with students under 
any circumstance because students often initiate that physical 
contact.288  Thus, the teacher’s behavior could not be found 
insubordinate when the directions given to him had been either 
vague or unrealistic.289  It was also relevant that where conduct 
guidelines were clear and specific, the teacher rarely, if ever, 
violated those guidelines.290  Thus, none of the actions charged 
against the teacher met the widely accepted arbitral definition of 
insubordination: “A willful refusal to carry out a clear and proper 
 
 282. Id. 
 283. See Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 272, Eden Prairie v. Minn. Educ. Ass’n., BMS 
Case No. 94-TD-6, 12 (1994) (Flagler, Arb.). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 2. 
 286. Id. at 12. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
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work directive, or any overt act to undermine or treat with 
contempt, the authority of the employer and its agents.”291 
Evidence of verbal or physical abuse—whether labeled 
insubordination or otherwise—will typically support a teacher’s 
immediate discharge.  This is true even if the teacher claims 
unlawful discrimination.  In Villarreal v. Independent School District 
No. 659,292 a Mexican-American teacher who had been with the 
Northfield School District for twenty-one years, and who had often 
been described as a “good teacher,” was nevertheless discharged 
based upon multiple occasions of verbal and physical abuse.293 The 
teacher then filed a lawsuit alleging that the district had violated 
Minnesota’s Human Rights Act294 by illegally and discriminatorily 
discharging him.295 
In upholding the teacher’s discharge, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court reviewed the charges and found that summary judgment in 
favor of the school district was appropriate.296  The court concluded 
that as the evidence had been sufficient to support Villareal’s 
immediate discharge, he was precluded from making a prima facie 
showing of racial discrimination, for an essential element of such a 
claim is proof that one is qualified for the position in the first 
place.297  Similarly, arbitrators have not tolerated physical and 
verbal abuse despite a teacher’s efforts to justify that behavior based 
upon his cultural background,298 nor have they been accepting of 
teachers who fail to acknowledge the inappropriateness of 
 
 291. Id. 
 292. 520 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. 1994). 
 293. Id. at 736. 
 294. MINN. STAT. § 363A.08, subd. 1(d) (Supp. 2003). 
 295. Villareal, 520 N.W.2d at 737. 
 296. Id. at 739. 
 297. Id. at 738 (citing Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 442 
(Minn. 1983)).  The Supreme Court's formulation in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) of the 
plaintiff's prima facie case of discriminatory hiring slightly modified to fit a claim 
of discriminatory discharge: 
The discharged employee carries the initial burden of establishing a 
prima facie case by showing (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) 
he was qualified for the job from which he was discharged; (3) he was 
discharged; and (4) the employer assigned a nonmember of the 
protected class to do the same work. 
Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 442. 
 298. See Minneapolis Pub. Sch. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis v. 
Minneapolis Fed’n of Teachers, Local 59, AFT, AFL-CIO, BMS Case No. 95-TD-2 
(1996) (Jacobowski, Arb.); Barnes-Griswold v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, St. Paul, 
BMS Case No. 03-TD-6 (2003) (Ver Ploeg, Arb.). 
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blameworthy behavior.299 
A teacher shown to be dishonest also has little latitude to 
protest a discharge, especially if there has been a prior warning.300  
For example, in Anderson v. Independent School Dist. No. 623,301  the 
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the discharge of a school 
teacher who lied about being sick in order to attend to personal 
matters on a school day.  In her appeal, the teacher relied upon an 
earlier decision in which a district had been prevented from 
discharging a teacher for taking one unauthorized day of sick 
leave.302  Anderson argued that her case was “virtually identical” and 
dictated the same result.303  The court rejected that argument, 
explaining that here the teacher had misused sick leave not once, 
but twice, and had done so after being warned that such conduct 
could be grounds for immediate discharge.304  Although the court 
agreed that discharge was a severe penalty, it apparently saw no way 
to overturn the board’s discretion when the plain language of the 
statute authorized a teacher’s immediate discharge when there was 
a proven “[f]ailure without justifiable cause to teach without first 
securing the written release of the school board . . . .”305 
Despite the harshness of this penalty, it is also true that giving 
false information is viewed differently when it is not intentional.306  
For example, in Liffrig v. Independent School District No. 442, the 
district discharged a seventeen-year high school principal 
immediately for “immoral conduct” and “conduct unbecoming a 
principal” based on evidence that he had (1) charged the school 
district for hours of behind-the-wheel driver’s training that were 
not given to the students, and (2) falsely certified to the State of 
Minnesota and to various insurance companies that students had 
completed the state mandated six hours of behind-the-wheel 
driver’s training.307 
Agreeing that the principal’s records were by his own 
 
 299. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 112, Chaska  v. Dr. Mario Cianflone, BMS Case No. 
99-TD-2, 21 (1999) (Vernon, Arb.). 
 300. See Anderson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 623, 292 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. 1980). 
 301. 292 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. 1980). 
 302. Id. at 563. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 563-64. 
 306. See Liffrig v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 442, Oslo, 292 N.W.2d 726 (Minn. 
1980). 
 307. Id. at 727. 
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admission “shabby,”308 the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the 
extent of the records that he did keep, many of which were in his 
head, as well as the principal’s numerous responsibilities, and 
concluded that his omissions had been unintentional.309  The court 
defined “intent” as a “subjective state of mind usually established by 
reasonable inference from surrounding circumstances.”310  Thus, 
although “the school board’s findings are entitled to respect, they 
must be reversed when unsupported by substantial evidence in the 
record.”311  Given the principal’s lack of intent to defraud, the court 
overturned the discharge.312 
3. Sexual Boundary Issues 
No group of cases commands more public attention and 
strong feeling than those that involve charges of improper 
touching or sexual contact with students.  It is difficult both to 
pursue and to defend charges of this type because of their sensitive 
nature and problems of proof.  The growing numbers of these 
cases illustrate their many complexities.  For example, in cases that 
typically pit a student’s charge against a teacher’s unequivocal 
denial, how is credibility to be evaluated?  Can a district choose not 
to subject its students to the stress of testifying on these sensitive 
matters and still meet its burden of proof?  To what extent is there 
a difference between verbal misconduct and physical misconduct?  
Are there gradations of misconduct and, if so, at what point has a 
teacher crossed permissible boundaries?  What if the student 
involved is a former student, now graduated? 
The many Minnesota court and arbitration decisions that have 
grappled with these issues have virtually unanimously upheld a 
teacher’s immediate discharge when a district has proven that the 
conduct complained of did in fact occur.  This is not surprising 
given the nature of these cases, the high standards to which a 
teacher is held, and the unique nature of the teacher-student 
relationship.  Thus, as the following cases demonstrate, once 
evidence is found to support the charges, the teacher’s immediate 
 
 308. Id. at 728. 
 309. Id. at 729. 
 310. Id. (citing State v. Schweppe, 306 Minn. 395, 401, 237 N.W.2d 609, 614 
(1975)). 
 311. Id. at 730. 
 312. Id. 
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discharge is never in real doubt. 313  That is why these cases typically 
turn on the quality and quantity of evidence concerning the 
essential question: Did the events charged actually occur?  The 
following cases illustrate the type of evidence that has been found 
sufficient to meet a district’s burden of proof. 
In one case, a twenty-two-year district employee was discharged 
based on charges that many years earlier he had sexually molested 
an elementary student over a four-year period.314  At the hearing, 
the student provided the only testimony concerning his claims that 
he had been called “to the principal’s office once or twice a month 
for visits that included sexual contact with the principal.”315  The 
student corroborated his testimony by diagramming the general 
layout of the principal’s office and the adjoining general office.316  
This raised two fact issues: (1) was it physically possible for the 
principal to have achieved the necessary privacy with the student, 
and (2) was it possible that others would have failed to notice such 
frequent visits?317 
Although the first question was easily resolved with evidence 
that simply closing one door and lowering the window shades 
would have provided the necessary privacy, the second was more 
difficult.318  Two teachers and the principal’s secretary each testified 
that they did not recall such frequent visits by the student.319  
However, they also admitted that it was difficult to recall anything 
about incidents alleged to have occurred thirteen or more years 
ago.320  Given the uncertain nature of this evidence, the court of 
appeals was obliged to directly consider whether the student or the 
principal was more credible. 
After first acknowledging its obligation to defer to the 
judgment of fact finders who have seen and heard the witnesses 
 
 313. It is also important to note that Minnesota’s teacher organizations have 
been very proactive in educating their members on boundary issues and where 
there is compelling evidence that a teacher has violated those boundaries, they 
often play an important role in quietly and privately facilitating the teacher’s 
removal not only from the district, but sometimes also from the profession. 
 314. Fisher v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 622, N. St. Paul/Maplewood, 357 N.W.2d 
152 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
 315. Id. at 154. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. 
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and judged their credibility,321  the court explained why it agreed 
that the student was more credible.  First, as in any case, it was 
highly relevant that the student’s testimony about the abusive 
behavior had been detailed and consistent. The court was also 
impressed that the victim had accurately diagrammed both the 
principal’s inner and outer offices, including the location of 
furniture within the office and photographs of the principal’s 
children, even though he had not been there for thirteen years.322  
Moreover, other witnesses’ testimony, “although not nearly as 
critical,” established that the incidents could have taken place 
without being observed.323  It was undisputed that while children 
were frequently called to the office, no records were kept of those 
visits.324 The principal’s secretary also testified that she could not 
recall ever interrupting him when his door was closed.325 
It is rare for any employee, including teachers, to be 
disciplined for “old” events.  Memories fade and evidence is no 
longer available.  Certainly remoteness was a relevant concern in 
this case, for here the essential question involved events that 
allegedly occurred between thirteen and seventeen years earlier.326  
Despite this concern, the court found that the passage of time 
alone did not mean the teacher was denied due process.327  Noting 
that Minnesota law has no time limits for immediately discharging a 
teacher, the court found that the student’s twelve-year silence on 
this matter did not render the incidents so remote as to have 
unfairly prejudiced the principal.328  Although it was true that 
witnesses were unable to recall how often the student had visited 
the principal’s office, that evidence was relatively unimportant 
when compared with that of the only two “real witnesses.”329  The 
court explained that 
[t]he sexual contact alleged here occurred in the private 
confines of the principal’s office.  It was not likely to 
produce any corroborating evidence, nor is any required.  
 
 321. Id. at 155 (citing Estate of Serbus v. Serbus, 324 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 
1982)). 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. at 156. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
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Appellant had a lengthy hearing on the charges, 
conducted by an impartial hearing examiner, with every 
opportunity for cross-examination. We believe that these 
procedures were fundamentally fair and satisfied the 
requirements of due process.330 
Providing further insight into its reasoning, the court cited 
with favor a 1980 district court memorandum concerning a teacher 
discharged for having sexual relations with a sixteen-year old 
student three to four years earlier: 
The fortuitous fact that the school board did not have 
immediate knowledge of the alleged sexual relationship 
with the sixteen-year old minor student is not the Board’s 
fault.  There is no showing that the Board unduly delayed 
in bringing this termination action after it had received 
knowledge of the alleged occurrence.  By virtue of the 
nature of the offense—sexual intercourse with a minor student of 
the district—it may be considered doubtful whether such conduct 
could ever be too remote in time.331 
Since 1991, when the legislature amended Minnesota law to 
permit teachers to appeal their proposed discharges to arbitrators 
rather than school boards and independent hearing examiners,332 
virtually all contested teacher discharges have been taken to 
arbitration.  Although arbitration decisions are not given the same 
precedential weight as appellate court decisions, arbitration itself 
has developed a body of common law that has guided the decision-
making process in labor relations for many years and has added to 
the earlier guidance provided by Minnesota courts.333 In addition, 
arbitrators’ decisions typically provide more detailed discussions of 
the evidence than do published judicial decisions. 
One of the first cases taken to arbitration involved a thirty-two-
year counselor who had been employed in the Austin School 
District for fifteen years.334  Although the counselor had previously 
 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. (citing Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 294, No. 12305 (Minn. 3d Dist. 
Ct. Feb. 12,  1980) (mem.), in which “a teacher was discharged for having sexual 
relations with a 16-year-old student despite the hearing taking place three to four 
years after the incident”). 
 332. See MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 15 (2002). 
 333. See generally THE COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE: THE VIEW OF 
ARBITRATORS § 6.6 (Theodore J. St. Antoine ed., 1998) [hereinafter THE COMMON 
LAW]. 
 334. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 492, Austin v. Minn. Educ. Ass’n, BMS Case No. 92-
TD-3 (1992) (Fogelberg, Arb.). 
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been warned about complaints against him, additional complaints 
arose in 1991 that triggered his proposed discharge.335  Charges 
included claims that the counselor had improperly disclosed 
private data and had failed to file a mandatory report regarding an 
incident or incidences of maltreatment.336  However, the heart of 
the case characterized as the “pivotal charge,” centered on the 
events of a single day, when the counselor was alleged to have had 
inappropriate sexual contact with his former counselee.337  The 
counselor vehemently denied the charges, and nearly 80 percent of 
the hearing was devoted to evidence concerning that disputed 
event.338  In his award, Arbitrator Fogelberg recognized that charges 
of improper physical conduct are so self-evidently serious that “[i]f 
the [e]mployer can meet their [sic] burden of proof concerning 
this particular claim, then there is truly little need to consider the 
balance of the evidence.  Plainly it is a most serious charge and one 
that under statute, allows the Board to terminate a tenured teacher 
‘immediately.’”339  Indeed, the association’s brief acknowledged 
that if the counselor had assaulted the student in the manner 
asserted, “he should not be teaching in the District.”340 
After a lengthy discussion of the evidence concerning the 
student’s and the counselor’s credibility, including expert witness 
testimony which the arbitrator described as “critical,” Arbitrator 
Fogelberg accepted the student’s testimony and found that “the 
preponderant evidence supports a finding that it is more probable 
than not that the [g]rievant’s conduct on the day in question was 
immoral and unbecoming a person who occupies a very influential 
and sensitive position of trust within the school system.”341  The 
arbitrator was particularly persuaded that the student’s testimony 
had largely been consistent, at least to an acceptable degree, and 
other witnesses reported that the counselor had overstepped his 
professional boundaries in dealing with other students.342 
In an equally interesting case that same year, the Paynesville 
School District issued a notice of deficiency to a twelve-year band 
 
 335. Id. at 3. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. at 15. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id.  See also  MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 8 (1990) (recodified by 1998 
Minn. Laws 397 as MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 13 (2002)). 
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director after a student filed a sexual harassment complaint against 
him.343  The student’s parents were dissatisfied with this handling of 
their daughter’s complaint and proceeded to conduct their own 
investigation, telephoning former students to determine whether 
the band director might have sexually harassed them as well.344  
One student who initially denied having been sexually harassed 
later retracted her statement and alleged that she had had sex with 
the band director several times when she had been in high 
school.345  In addition, the parents learned that yet another former 
student had recently filed sexual harassment charges against the 
band director, who in addition to his job at the high school, was 
giving music lessons at the college she was currently attending.346  
After the parents brought this additional information to the 
district’s attention, the board adopted a resolution proposing the 
band director’s immediate discharge based upon twelve specific 
factual grounds that Arbitrator Miller later grouped into three 
broad categories.347 
The first group of allegations involved the student who had 
graduated from high school the prior year.348  She complained that 
since that time the band director, who gave music lessons at the 
college she was attending, had inappropriately complimented her 
physical appearance and had made sexually provocative 
comments.349  The band director did not deny that he had given 
her presents or hugged her and kissed her under the mistletoe.350  
A college investigation of the matter found the band director’s 
actions to be inappropriate, and he was warned that similar future 
behavior could lead to further discipline including termination.351  
Although the band director claims he was never notified of this 
report, he nevertheless resigned his position at the college.352 
It was not until the arbitration hearing that this student for the 
 
 343. Indep. Sch Dist. 741, Paynesville v. Minn. Educ. Ass’n, BMS Case No. 94-
TD-12 (1994) (Miller, Arb.). 
 344. Id. at 3. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. at 3-4. 
 347. Id. at 4. 
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 351. Id. at 11-12. 
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first time alleged that the director had also sexually touched her.353  
However, Arbitrator Miller indicated he would not consider those 
belated allegations as they had not been included in the proposed 
notice of discharge. 354  Moreover, he held that because this alleged 
conduct occurred off school premises on the band director’s own 
time the district had failed to prove a connection to his position in 
the high school.355 
The second group of allegations involved the student whose 
parents had pursued this investigation.  This student—who had 
been a high school junior and suffered from a serious heart 
condition—became uncomfortable when the band director 
showered her with attention, including giving her sentimental gifts, 
hugs, joking with her in a sexual fashion, tickling her, and having 
their picture taken together.356  Arbitrator Miller indicated that had 
these been the only charges against the band director he would 
have found the district’s initial notice of deficiency to have been 
appropriate.357  This is particularly interesting, as it was these 
parents’ dissatisfaction with that very notice that had caused them 
to undertake their own investigation that led to the proposed 
discharge at issue. 
The third and most damning complaint concerned a third 
accuser’s allegations that she and the director had sexual 
intercourse four times and oral sex once when that witness had 
been a senior at the high school ten years earlier.358  Everyone 
understood that the credibility of these allegations would 
determine whether the band director retained his job.359  In an 
apparently riveting “she said, he said” fashion, the band director 
challenged the allegations by asking why, if the allegations were 
true, did the woman thereafter invite him to her wedding?360  Why 
did she and her husband both take golf lessons from him, and why 
would they have invited the director and his family to visit them 
when they vacationed in North Dakota?361 
Arbitrator Miller looked to the victim’s husband for the 
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answers to these questions.362  The husband was a minister, and as 
such was someone who “preaches forgiveness of sin.”363  His “very 
forthright” testimony and his rationale for his and his wife’s 
decision to forgive was described as totally believable:364 
Given his strong religious beliefs, their decision, and 
especially his decision, was based on the teachings of their 
religion, which mandates to forgive and befriend their 
enemies.  It therefore should come as no surprise to 
anyone that [the husband] was willing to forgive Mr. 
Hanson for his transgressions against his wife and still be 
cordial to Mr. Hanson and his family.365 
Other evidence supported the district.  For example, an 
experienced licensed psychologist explained how the former 
student had been raised to be submissive and to obey authority 
figures and that she was “not in a position to say no” to the band 
director’s sexual advances.366  Arbitrator Miller took special note of 
the fact that there had been no expert witness to testify for the 
band director.367  The expert who did interview him, and who 
administered three separate personality tests (MMPI-II, California 
Personality Inventory and a Rorschach) did not testify to the truth 
of the director’s denials.368  It was also noteworthy that the director 
had absolutely every reason to lie, for “his reputation, career and 
even his marriage are at stake.”369 In contrast, the complainant had 
nothing to gain and everything to lose from testifying 
against Mr. Hanson.  In order to testify in this hearing, 
she was forced to disclose her extramarital affair.  This 
disclosure was painful to her husband and their marriage.  
It could also damage his career in the clergy and their 
family’s reputation in the community and church.  It is 
difficult to imagine that anyone would subject herself to 
this type of scrutiny, in order to make false accusations 
against someone.370 
The psychologist confirmed this observation, testifying that the 
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woman’s personality and upbringing as a “good Christian girl” 
made it very unlikely that she would fabricate a story concerning 
having sex with the band director if that were not true.371  For these 
reasons the arbitrator concluded that the band director had 
committed a “heinous act” when he had sex with a high school 
student,372 and he deserved no leniency whatsoever.  Arbitrator 
Miller stated, “A teacher does not need to be warned that it is 
wrong to have sexual intercourse with a student.  In fact, proof of a 
teacher’s sexual acts with a student is sufficient grounds for 
immediate discharge.”373 
One difficulty that often arises in these cases is a lengthy time 
period between alleged incidents of improper behavior and a 
district’s response.  This is, of course, often due to victims’ not-
uncommon reluctance to report such sensitive incidents because of 
embarrassment, guilt, intimidation, or ignorance that the conduct 
was wrongful.  Sometimes, incidents dealt with at the time later 
resurface in the context of a larger pattern of behavior.  For 
example, in 1998 Arbitrator Imes heard evidence that 
approximately seven years earlier a fifteen-year-old female student 
had joined her music teacher and his wife at their home to watch 
television, at which time the teacher had put his hand under her 
sweatshirt and touched her “bra-covered breasts.”374  The student 
recorded this incident in her diary and eventually told her friends 
and her parents.375  When she also told two teachers and the school 
counselor, the superintendent reported the matter to the police 
(who did not file charges) and told the teacher that he would be 
discharged if there was another similar incident.376  The teacher 
eventually apologized to the student and they were still friends at 
the time of the hearing.377 
Five years after the incident, the district hired a new 
superintendent who eventually learned of this incident from the 
president of the local union who was seeking to protect other 
teachers who were being laid off for budgetary reasons.378  In the 
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course of following up on this report, the superintendent also 
discovered that the teacher was spending many late nights at school 
on his computer.379  Further investigation revealed that he was 
visiting sites with pictures of nude and partially undressed women, 
some of which he downloaded, and that he had also downloaded 
two short movie clips the district described as pornographic.380 
Arbitrator Imes reviewed the evidence and found the 
allegations to be true.381  Nevertheless, she concluded that with 
respect to the initial incident that had occurred in the early 1990s, 
for which the teacher had been given what was characterized as an 
“oral warning,” discipline now would constitute double jeopardy.382  
Rejecting the argument that double jeopardy only applies to 
criminal proceedings, Imes held that the teacher could not now be 
punished a second time for the same behavior.383 
This case is also an interesting forerunner of what has come to 
be a growing number of workplace “internet abuse” cases.  It arose 
at a time when employers were only starting to recognize the extent 
to which some employees were abusing their internet privileges, 
with much of that activity involving sexual content so that claims of 
sexual harassment began to emerge as a real concern.  With this 
growing risk, many employers have now adopted formal policies 
that restrict employee use of the computers, especially with respect 
to sexually oriented sites.  However, at the time of this hearing it is 
not surprising that this district did not have such a policy. 
Although Arbitrator Imes acknowledged that one could 
credibly argue that it should be unnecessary to advise employees 
not to view and download material of such questionable taste, she 
nevertheless found that “an incident of this nature does not rise to 
a level that sustains immediate discharge.”384  Declining to find that 
this action, “while incredibly stupid,” was so harmful as to warrant 
immediate discharge, Imes did express her opinion that the 
teacher’s conduct did warrant some type of discipline.385  However, 
because neither party had proposed a lesser penalty at the hearing, 
she lacked the authority to issue a lesser penalty on her own 
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initiative.386 
In contrast, in a more recent case Arbitrator Fogelberg upheld 
the discharge of a high school instructor found to have 
downloaded approximately seventy-five to eighty pages of 
pornographic material from his computer at school during his 
prep time.387  In addition, the instructor had accumulated 
hundreds of pages of anarchist material on a variety of subjects 
such as how to bomb a building, make explosives, tap into 
telephones, steal credit card numbers, make firecrackers, use 
dynamite and more.388  Fogelberg rejected each of the instructor’s 
three lines of defense: (1) that he had been given no clear policy, 
(2) that he had insufficient warning that his behavior was not 
acceptable, and (3) that there had been no harm.389  In doing so, 
he reiterated the widely-held view that some conduct is so clearly 
objectionable that specific directives and warnings of consequences 
are unnecessary: “A teacher viewing and downloading pornography 
in a high school setting, while ‘on the job’ would know, or should 
have known, that accessing such materials was highly inappropriate 
and not without serious consequences if discovered.”390 
More recently, Arbitrator Olson ordered a one-semester 
suspension without pay and a psychological evaluation with 
counseling by a qualified professional of the District’s choosing and 
at the teacher’s expense, after finding that a teacher had shown 
one objectionable computer image to young students and had kept 
other inappropriate images on a district computer.391  Although 
Arbitrator Olson was unwilling to uphold the teacher’s immediate 
discharge based upon this evidence, she was also unwilling to give a 
mere “slap on the wrist” with a written reprimand or a short 
suspension.392  In striking this balance, Arbitrator Olson itemized 
the evidence that had been important to her decision: 
I consider this teacher’s audience of vulnerable 
adolescents and their emerging response to sexuality; the 
teacher’s admission that he was familiar with the two 
 
 386. See infra Part VII. 
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relevant District policies and knew his computer images 
would violate them; the possibility of unwanted and 
unexpected intrusion of sexual images on District staff 
whose duties are to monitor the District’s computers; the 
apparent appeal of vulgar sexual images for the teacher; 
his lack of understanding, even at hearing, of his 
misconduct; parental concerns about returning this 
teacher to the classroom. 
Balanced against those matters are these facts: only one 
student complained about the cactus picture and then 
only to her friends, not to the District; the four images 
found on his computer were not seen by the students; no 
witness refuted his denial about the cartoons; the 
teacher’s ten-year record of service without incident; the 
relative ease with which the teacher’s inappropriate 
computer use can be rectified; the reluctance of the 
courts to uphold termination if behavior can be changed; 
the willingness of the District to propose a lesser penalty 
than discharge.393 
Arbitrator Olson’s list illustrates the extent to which the 
growing number of “on-line pornography” cases has now developed 
widely accepted guidelines, and can provide helpful guidance in 
similar cases. 
D. Off-Duty Misconduct 
The larger arena of labor relations has long presumed that an 
employee’s private life is beyond an employer’s control and that 
employers are not society’s enforcers.  Only when an employer can 
show a connection—a “nexus”—between off-duty misconduct and 
an adverse effect on the business, does the employer have a 
legitimate interest in what would otherwise be considered the 
employee’s personal activities. 
Sometimes, a collective bargaining agreement will specify the 
type of off-duty conduct for which an employer can discipline an 
employee and there will be no need to prove nexus. However, most 
often an employer will be forced to demonstrate a causal 
connection between that conduct and the workplace.  The 
National Academy of Arbitrators has identified the four most 
common ways to show nexus: 
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(a) Misconduct involving harm or threats to supervisors, 
co-workers, customers, or others with an actual or 
potential business relationship with the employer; 
(b) Misconduct that could seriously damage an 
employer’s public image; 
(c) Misconduct that reasonably makes it difficult or 
impossible for co-workers, customers, or others with an 
actual or potential business relationship with the 
employer to deal with the employee; or 
(d) Public attacks on the employer, supervisors or the 
employer’s product.394 
Nexus raises special considerations in education because many 
courts and arbitrators hold teachers to a higher standard of 
behavior. This higher standard of behavior is not only applied to 
teachers’ duties at school, but also to their private lives away from 
school.  There are occasions when doing so is reasonable.  For 
example, it would not be difficult to find a harm, or threat of harm, 
to students when a teacher has abused a child outside of the school.  
In fact, the Academy expressly cites the examples of a “teacher 
convicted of child abuse away from work and a drug counselor 
convicted of selling drugs away from work” as “clear examples of 
situations in which the employer’s image might be irreparably 
harmed if it retained the offending employee.”395  A teacher 
arrested for immoral behavior or drug-related activities, whose 
arrest is widely reported, may have difficulty continuing to function 
effectively in the classroom. 
Thus, education cases add unique dimensions to the question 
of nexus.  The Minnesota Court of Appeal’s 1987 decision In re 
Proposed Discharge of Donald Lee Shelton396 illustrates some of these 
considerations.  In Shelton, three district teachers formed a 
computer corporation.397  One served as secretary/treasurer and 
was the sole signatory for all corporate bank accounts.398  Six years 
into the venture the two other teachers confronted the 
secretary/treasurer with evidence of his unauthorized withdrawal 
of corporate funds.399  The teacher admitted that he had been 
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stealing funds for over two years and had also forged the others’ 
signatures on personal bank guarantees.400  They reported this theft 
to the sheriff’s department, and the teacher agreed to return his 
shares of stock to the corporation and pay restitution.401 
That fall the teacher returned to his seventh and twelfth grade 
social studies classrooms.402  Later, when his theft became common 
knowledge throughout the community, staff members were divided 
concerning his continued teaching.403  A substitute teacher who 
covered the teacher’s social studies classes during a seven-week 
medical leave that January reported difficulty controlling those 
classes, and there was evidence that the senior class was unusually 
disruptive throughout the year.404  In March, the teacher was 
charged with theft by swindle and on May 30, he pled guilty to one 
count of theft as full prosecution for his offenses. 405  At the end of 
the school year the school board proposed the teacher’s immediate 
discharge, citing his theft as immoral conduct and conduct 
unbecoming a teacher.406  Before this incident, his teaching record 
had been unblemished.407 
After hearing this matter, the hearing examiner recommended 
that the board rescind the proposed discharge because “no 
evidence exists to suggest that the teacher is not fully remediated or 
that there is a likelihood that he will commit a similar crime in the 
future.”408  Nevertheless, the school board voted unanimously to 
discharge the teacher, having concluded that his stealing over 
$35,000 had “resulted in an irremediable deterioration of faculty 
relations, inability to effectively teach because of lack of credibility 
and adverse relationship with the community.”409 
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered the 
teacher’s argument that he should be given the opportunity to 
demonstrate his ability to continue teaching because there was no 
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direct relationship between his conduct and his fitness to teach.410  
Shelton insisted that he had not lost his credibility in the 
classroom, citing the testimony of students who had welcomed his 
return from surgery and respected his ability to face his mistakes.411  
However, the district argued that the teacher, who taught in the 
area of business ethics and social studies, had lost his credibility to 
teach such values and that his presence created turmoil within the 
faculty.412  The teacher countered by arguing that he should not be 
held responsible for turmoil incited by others, particularly by his 
two former partners who were leading the opposition against 
him.413 
The court considered these arguments and, after noting the 
paucity of evidence or findings concerning student reaction to the 
teacher’s continued presence, nevertheless agreed that it had been 
a “strongly emotional” school year for the faculty and that “[w]hile 
relator may be genuinely sorry for, and may be unlikely to repeat, 
his conduct, the record does support the school board’s conclusion 
that relator’s continued presence in this small school district will 
result in faculty disorder and an unsatisfactory learning 
environment.”414 
One interesting aspect of the court’s discussion of this case is 
the observation that although the teacher’s misconduct rendered 
him unable to continue teaching in Blooming Prairie, apparently 
he was still well qualified to teach in any other district: 
Relator still has his teaching license and can continue in 
his profession.  Faculty members testified relator is well 
qualified to teach in any other district.  Had this matter 
arisen in a larger school district, it is likely reassignment of 
relator to another school within the district would suffice 
as a remedy.  But given the small size of the Blooming 
Prairie school district and the high school which houses 
grades 7-12, it is not error to conclude relator’s ‘conduct 
can only be remedied by his removal as a teacher in the 
Blooming Prairie Schools.’415 
Similarly, in a case involving the Duluth School District,416 
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Arbitrator Berquist reviewed the proposed demotion of a school 
principal to the rank of teacher for shoplifting six items of clothing 
with a total value of $311.417  The principal sought to explain her 
conduct with evidence that at the time of the incident she had 
been on pain relievers, and this had left her “confused” and 
“spacey.”418  Demoting the principal to the rank of teacher would 
have placed her at the bottom of the seniority list, with a loss of 
$11,000 a year and over twenty years’ seniority.419 
In weighing the evidence, Arbitrator Berquist was persuaded 
that the principal sincerely believed that her medications had 
played a part in this unfortunate event, and he found that “the 
record does not support a finding of dishonesty” on her part.420  In 
addition, he specially noted that this incident had occurred off-duty 
on a Sunday, and that it “had no connection with the District.”421  
He accepted that an employer can discipline for otherwise private 
conduct if that conduct “(1) harms the employer’s business; (2) 
adversely affects the employee’s ability to perform his or her job; or 
(3) leads other employees to refuse to work with the recalcitrant.”422  
However, he concluded that those exceptions did not apply in this 
case, where the only apparent linkage was a press release 
concerning the matter.423  This was not enough to support 
discipline for “such private conduct.”424 
E. The Troubled Teacher 
Difficult issues arise when a district proposes to discharge a 
teacher whose misconduct relates to psychological problems or 
chemical dependency.  Recent years have seen a growing 
acceptance of the medical dimensions of these cases.  This has led 
to an increased willingness to give a teacher a second chance (often 
characterized as a “last chance”) if the condition has been or 
probably can be treated and the misconduct is not likely to be 
repeated.  However, a discharge will be directed if it appears that 
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remedial efforts are not likely to succeed, or the teacher can no 
longer be an effective peer for colleagues or role model for 
students. 
An arbitration involving the Moorehead School District 
illustrates many of these issues.425  In that case, a tenured teacher 
with no prior discipline had called in sick and then gone on a 
drinking binge.426  After he urinated and exposed himself in public, 
and nearly caused a car accident, police apprehended the teacher 
and put him in jail.427  After learning of these events, the 
Moorehead School Board weighed the egregious nature of this 
conduct, the fact that it occurred during the school day, and the 
widespread publicity that followed.  The school board proposed the 
teacher’s immediate discharge on the grounds of “immoral 
conduct . . . conduct unbecoming a teacher which requires the 
teacher’s removal from the classroom . . . and/or willful neglect of 
duty.”428  The arbitrator discussed each of these grounds in detail.429 
First, the arbitrator agreed while the teacher’s conduct had 
been “unbecoming,” it could not be characterized as “immoral.”430  
Relying on Webster’s Dictionary to equate immorality with 
“wickedness” or “vice,” the arbitrator found that this behavior, 
“although truly inappropriate, embarrassing and illegal, lacked 
sufficient volition and malice to be deemed ‘immoral.’”431  
Similarly, the arbitrator defined “willful” as “deliberate” and 
“intentional,” and found that such was not the case given the 
evidence that the teacher’s conduct was entirely attributable to his 
alcoholism and his then-undiagnosed depression, both recognized 
as diseases.432 
With the above findings, the essential question then became: 
Was the teacher’s undisputed conduct so egregious that it required 
the teacher’s “immediate discharge” from the classroom?433  The 
district argued that his conduct was so egregious, he could no 
longer be a “positive role model” and he had violated the “very 
 
 425. Daly v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 152, Moorhead, BMS Case No. 00-TD-2 
(2000) (Ver Ploeg, Arb.). 
 426. Id. at 2-3. 
 427. Id. 
 428. Id. at 5-6. 
 429. Id. at 6-9. 
 430. Id. at 7-8. 
 431. Id. at 7. 
 432. Id. at 8-9. 
 433. Id. at 9-10. 
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principles” he was expected to impart to his tenth grade health 
students, as expressly directed in their curriculum.434  In 
considering this argument the parties agreed that “teachers are 
viewed as role models for students.”435  Nevertheless, the teacher 
was reinstated after the arbitrator applied the criteria first 
articulated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Kroll v. Independent 
School District No. 593.436 
Kroll directed fact-finders to first consider a teacher’s prior 
record.437  However, here the parties had staked out very different 
positions concerning what constituted the teacher’s “prior 
record.”438  The district acknowledged that it had never disciplined 
or otherwise directed the teacher concerning his use of alcohol, 
and there was no evidence that he ever taught or was even on 
school premises while impaired.439  Nor was his classroom 
performance at issue.440  Thus, if the teacher’s prior record was 
limited to his employment record, this factor would weigh against 
discharge.  However, the district countered that the “record” 
should be defined more expansively to embrace the teacher’s 
public and private life, based on evidence that 
[s]ince junior high the Teacher has experienced sobriety 
for a period of only three and one-half years.  He was in 
treatment three previous times, and arrested and 
convicted three times for alcohol related crimes, two of 
which were DUI’s. Notwithstanding his prior treatment 
and his lengthy participation in AA, the Teacher’s lack of 
control has only worsened.441 
Thus, the question was whether the teacher’s “prior record” 
extended to his entire life history, including his off-duty conduct, 
or whether inquiry was limited to his “employment record with the 
District.”442  The arbitrator decided this question by stating, 
“Without denying the relevance of a teacher’s entire course of 
conduct, in this case I find the lack of any evidence of alcohol 
 
 434. Id. at 7-8. 
 435. Id. at 8. 
 436. Id. at 10-20 (citing Kroll v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 593, 304 N.W.2d 338 
(Minn. 1981), also discussed supra Part V). 
 437. Id. at 11 (citing Kroll, 304 N.W.2d at 345). 
 438. See id. at 12-17. 
 439. Id. at 16. 
 440. Id. 
 441. Id. 
 442. Id. at 17. 
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related use or impairment associated with the Teacher’s teaching 
duties to be highly relevant. This evidence falls short of Kroll’s first 
factor.”443 
Next it was necessary to consider how serious the teacher’s 
conduct had been.444  The teacher’s attorney argued that 
immediate discharge cases typically involve “teachers accused of 
‘bad acts’ such as sexual or physical abuse of students,” and urged 
that this was not so serious a case.445  The teacher had never been 
under the influence or “in any way impaired . . . while teaching or 
otherwise on school property.”446  Nor had he ever been disciplined 
or otherwise directed concerning his alcohol use.447  The arbitrator 
considered, but ultimately did not accept this argument by 
reasoning that even though these events had not occurred on 
school premises or with students, they “did occur during the school 
day.”448  Moreover, it could be assumed that all of the students were 
aware of what had happened and that this knowledge had 
consequences: 
The District has had to deal with the very real—although 
perhaps intangible—consequences of having someone 
who should have been a role model and authority figure 
demonstrate the very behavior that adults fear most on 
the part of impressionable teens. The fallout from the 
Teacher’s behavior should not be underestimated.449 
For many of the same reasons the arbitrator found the teacher’s 
conduct to be serious, that conduct was also found to pose “actual 
or threatened harm” and thus met Kroll’s third factor.450  
Nevertheless, the arbitrator tempered that conclusion with the 
observation that 
[h]owever, it may also be true that the enormity of these 
events, of which all the students must surely be aware, may 
also serve to impress upon them the power of chemical 
dependency and the fragility of the human condition. If 
the Teacher returned to the classroom and maintained a 
successful fight against his disease—a battle which he 
 
 443. Id. 
 444. Id. 
 445. Id. 
 446. Id. 
 447. Id. 
 448. Id. 
 449. Id. at 17-18. 
 450. Id. at 18. 
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must fight for the rest of his life for there is no “cure” for 
alcoholism—the courage of his fight could well permit 
him to regain, and perhaps even surpass, his earlier 
positive influence on students.451 
Finally, the arbitrator had to determine whether the teacher’s 
conduct could have been corrected with a warning.452  The greatest 
portion of the award was devoted to weighing the competing 
evidence and arguments concerning the teacher’s future ability to 
overcome his alcoholism and depression.453  The district argued 
that if the teacher had been able to control his drinking, then he 
would have done so following his three earlier efforts in treatment 
and after his three convictions for alcohol-related crimes.454  In 
essence, the district’s position was, “[t]he buck must stop 
sometime, and that time is now.”455  The teacher’s representative 
was more optimistic, offering evidence that the teacher had 
accepted responsibility for his actions, was following “every medical 
recommendation” and that his prognosis was good.456 
There is no guarantee that a person will avoid a future 
relapse.457  “The question is whether there are enough promising 
indicators to warrant” giving a teacher a chance to save his or her 
career.458  Here the arbitrator relied upon three promising 
indicators to give the teacher that chance.459  First, it was “evident 
that the Teacher’s misconduct had been the product of not only 
his life-long alcoholism, but also a closely linked depression.”460  
Until shortly before the arbitration, that depression had never been 
recognized or treated.461  The teacher had been on medications 
that appeared to be making a difference, and the arbitrator 
determined that “[t]his treatment deserves an opportunity to prove 
itself.”462 
Second, the district had neither challenged the teacher’s 
classroom performance nor claimed until now that his alcoholism 
 
 451. Id. 
 452. Id. at 18-20. 
 453. See id. 
 454. Id. at 18-19. 
 455. Id. at 19. 
 456. Id. 
 457. Id. 
 458. Id. 
 459. Id. 
 460. Id. 
 461. Id. 
 462. Id. 
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ever “infringed upon his teaching duties.”463  Thus, although the 
teacher had been unable to deal with his alcoholism in his private 
life, the district itself had “never been called upon to give him a 
‘second chance.’”464  The arbitrator held that it should at least give 
the teacher a “last chance” now.465 
Third, accepting the conventional wisdom that many 
alcoholics must “hit bottom” before they can improve, the 
arbitrator concluded that these events must surely represent the 
“bottom” for the teacher and if ever he were to understand the 
enormity of his illness and its consequences, “surely now is the 
time.”466 
Thus, the arbitrator did not order the teacher’s immediate 
discharge.  However, in recognition of the seriousness of this 
misconduct, he was issued a sixty-day unpaid suspension.467  That 
suspension was to be served at the district’s discretion and 
scheduled to “best accommodate its curricular needs.”468  In issuing 
this suspension, the arbitrator warned the teacher that he was “now 
on notice that he will be held to a very high standard of conduct.”469  
He had been given what might be characterized as a “last chance,” 
and “[a]ny future relapse and subsequent claim of remediability 
will surely be viewed with a much more jaundiced eye than has now 
been the case.”470  However, the arbitrator also expressed the 
sincere hope “that the Teacher will fulfill the pledge he has made 
in this proceeding to commit himself to a life of sobriety.  If he 
does so, he will win the admiration of his students, colleagues, 
family and community.”471 
F.  Medical Leaves and Disability 
The discharge of a teacher for disability related reasons also 
raises difficult issues.  While the Teacher Tenure Act472 is largely 
silent on the subject, subdivision 12 of the Continuing Contract Act 
 
 463. Id. 
 464. Id. 
 465. Id. 
 466. Id. at 20. 
 467. Id. 
 468. Id. 
 469. Id. 
 470. Id. 
 471. Id. 
 472. MINN. STAT. § 122A.41 (2002). 
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contains detailed provisions that govern the treatment of a teacher 
while on disability, and subdivision 13 provides that a district may 
immediately discharge a teacher who has been on disability for 
twelve months and is unable to qualify for reinstatement under the 
procedures of subdivision 12.473  In select cases, discharge for 
medical or disability reasons can provide a mutually beneficial way 
to tactfully remove a teacher who might otherwise be discharged 
for performance problems or personal misconduct. 
The Continuing Contract Act provides that a teacher may be 
placed on a leave of absence when he or she is shown to have 
“active tuberculosis or other communicable disease, mental illness, 
drug or alcohol addiction, or some other serious incapacity.”474  
During that leave the teacher must be given his or her accumulated 
sick leave benefits, and a district may in its discretion also grant 
additional benefits.475  A teacher who protests being placed on 
medical leave has the right to a district-paid medical examination 
by a doctor that he or she may select from a list of three names 
provided by the board, and failure to submit to the exam in the 
prescribed time subjects the teacher to immediate discharge.476  
The doctor’s report concerning the teacher’s medical condition is 
then presumably binding, with one exception.477  If mental illness is 
claimed, then the teacher and the board convene a panel of three 
physicians or psychiatrists who will examine the teacher and submit 
their findings and conclusions, which are also presumably 
binding.478  The district must reinstate a teacher following a 
medical leave after receiving medical verification within one year 
that he or she has sufficiently recovered to return to teaching.479 
Aside from these requirements a district can place a teacher 
on medical leave without providing a hearing, for such leave is 
neither a discharge nor a demotion under the statute.  For 
example, in Palmer v. Independent School District No. 917,480 a teacher 
was found to have properly been placed on a medical leave of 
absence when her physician, with her approval, reported that she 
should have no more than four hours of student contact time per 
 
 473. MINN. STAT. §§ 122A.40, 122A.41 (2002). 
 474. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 12. 
 475. Id. 
 476. Id. 
 477. See id. 
 478. Id. 
 479. Id. 
 480. 547 N.W.2d 899 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). 
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day.  When the district reduced her schedule to a .75 full-time 
equivalency to accommodate those restrictions, the teacher 
protested that she was entitled to have the balance of her hours 
instead assigned to non-student activities, in effect, paperwork and 
meetings scheduled to suit her needs.481  The court did not agree.482 
As a related matter, a teacher who is otherwise subject to 
discharge for cause cannot alternatively assert a right to take a leave 
of absence for medical reasons.  In Obermeyer v. School Board, 
Independent School District No. 282, 483 the Minnesota Supreme Court 
resolved possible confusion between the discharge for cause 
provisions484 and the medical leave provisions. 485  In Obermeyer, one 
week after the teacher requested a leave of absence to obtain 
treatment for alcoholism he pled guilty to having taken indecent 
liberties with a minor male student one month earlier.486  After a 
hearing, the board discharged the teacher for immoral conduct 
and at the same time determined that his request for a leave of 
absence was moot because he was no longer a district employee.487  
The teacher appealed to the district court, arguing that he should 
have been given a disability hearing before the discharge hearing.488 
In affirming the district court’s rejection of this claim, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court observed that “[a] mere reading of the 
statute makes clear that appellant is reading into it something 
which it does not provide.”489  A teacher does not have a right to a 
suspension and leave of absence.490  Rather, the language clearly 
demonstrates that the legislature’s intent was to prevent a district 
from discharging a teacher solely on the ground of serious mental 
or physical disability until twelve months passed.491  However, this 
does not prevent a district from discharging a teacher for other 
statutory reasons.492 
Other disability issues arise when a teacher returns to work 
 
 481. Id. at 901. 
 482. Id. at 906. 
 483. 311 Minn. 232, 247 N.W.2d 919 (1976). 
 484. MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 13 (2002). 
 485. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 12. 
 486. Obermeyer, 247 N.W.2d at 919. 
 487. Id. 
 488. Id. at 920. 
 489. Id. 
 490. Id. 
 491. Id. 
 492. Id. 
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under medical restrictions and then claims that the district has 
failed to honor those restrictions.  For example, in a case involving 
the Red Lake School District,493 a teacher who missed two years of 
work following a work-related car accident returned to teaching 
under the following restrictions: no prolonged posturing, no lifting 
or carrying over twenty pounds, needs semi-sedentary work that 
allows frequent change in body position, and full-time classroom 
work only.494 
In the fall of 1998, the district assigned the teacher to the 
position of High School In-School Suspension (ISS) Supervisor.495  
Despite the district’s extensive efforts to accommodate that 
position to the teacher’s medical restrictions and personal 
concerns,496 the teacher questioned his ability to deal with students 
whose behavioral problems caused them to be assigned to ISS in 
the first place.497  Thus, he refused to work the assignment, 
claiming that his doctor and his qualified rehabilitation consultant 
(QRC) had both advised him that if he thereafter suffered another 
on-the-job injury, his current “generous level of Workers 
Compensation benefits could be jeopardized.”498  In light of this 
continued refusal to accept the ISS assignment, the district 
proposed the teacher’s immediate discharge for insubordination, 
failure to teach, and willful neglect of duties.499 
The teacher candidly admitted that the ISS position 
technically accommodated his restrictions, as it would permit him 
to move freely at any time and required no lifting.500  His sole 
concern was that he could not handle the students assigned to 
 
 493. Indep. Sch. Dist. 38 & Grievant, BMS Case No. 99-TD-4 (1999) (Ver 
Ploeg, Arb.). 
 494. Id. at 2. 
 495. Id. at 3. 
 496. Id. 
There is undisputed evidence that in making this assignment the District 
altered the ISS room and surrounding area to accommodate the 
Teachers medical restrictions and perceived concerns. The District 
provided a special parking space for him immediately outside the ISS 
room; it stationed a security guard who would otherwise be in that wing 
of the building outside of the ISS room; and it installed several security 
and communications devices in the ISS room: a video camera, walkie 
talkie, and telephone. 
Id. 
 497. Id. at 3. 
 498. Id. 
 499. Id. at 4. 
 500. Id. at 7. 
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ISS.501  The arbitrator did not accept this argument, agreeing with 
the district that to the extent that any student might pose a physical 
threat, that threat also exists in any other classroom.502  Moreover, 
the district had provided exceptional security measures for the ISS 
room.503 
Nevertheless, the arbitrator declined to order the teacher’s 
discharge on the grounds that his refusal to accept the assignment 
had been reasonable, given that “doing so without formal medical 
authorization could jeopardize his workers’ compensation benefits 
if he suffered a future on-the-job injury.”504  The arbitrator rejected 
the district’s claim that the teacher had “drawn a line in the sand” 
and unreasonably infringed upon its management rights.505  
Instead, the teacher had been forced into a “Catch-22” situation in 
which “he felt forced to choose between potentially jeopardizing 
his Workers’ Compensation benefits and losing his job.”506  Thus, 
the district was ordered to reinstate the teacher and to have the ISS 
supervisor position evaluated.507 
In contrast, in a more recent case that also involved the Red 
Lake School District,508 Arbitrator Fogelberg found that an 
industrial arts teacher whose position was cut for budgetary reasons 
had “abandoned” his employment when he failed to report for his 
new teaching assignment.509  The teacher had filed for workers 
compensation benefits before the school year had started and then 
protested his fall assignment for medical reasons.510  After he 
 
 501. Id. 
 502. Id. 
 503. Id. 
 504. Id. 
It is undisputed that such benefits are based upon those available upon 
date of injury. In 1990, when the Teacher suffered his back and neck 
injury, Minnesota law provided for virtually unlimited Workers 
Comp[ensation] benefits. However, 1992 and 1995 legislation has 
substantially reduced those benefits so that any future injury that the 
Teacher might suffer would provide far less than he currently enjoys. 
Thus, it was reasonable for the Teacher to insist upon a formal evaluation 
of the ISS assignment before he exposed himself to its risks, real or 
imagined. 
Id. 
 505. Id. at 8. 
 506. Id. 
 507. Id. 
 508. Educ. Minn., Red Lake Local 2007 v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 38, Red Lake, 
BMS Case No. 02-TD-10 (2002) (Fogelberg, Arb.). 
 509. Id. at 15. 
 510. Id. at 3. 
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exhausted his sick and personal leave and still failed to return to 
work, despite repeated communications urging him to do so, the 
district placed the teacher on leave without pay and ultimately 
proposed his discharge for “job abandonment.”511  Arbitrator 
Fogelberg ordered that termination on the grounds that the 
teacher never provided the appropriate medical documentation to 
verify that he was unable to work.512 
VII. PENALTY 
Minnesota law denies an arbitrator the authority to order a 
lesser penalty than termination or discharge except “to the extent 
that either party proposes such lesser penalty in the proceeding.” 513  
Thus, an arbitrator who finds that the evidence would have 
supported some form of discipline—even if insufficient to support 
the discharge now at issue—cannot impose a lesser penalty if the 
parties have not granted him or her the right to do so.514  For 
example, in a case involving the Pillager School District, Arbitrator 
Imes found that the evidence did not support discharging the 
teacher because he abused his internet privileges.515  Although she 
did find that the evidence would have supported a lesser form of 
discipline, Imes could not order it because the parties had not 
given her the authority to do so.516 
Similarly, in a case involving the Duluth School District, the 
parties did not give Arbitrator Berquist the option of imposing a 
lesser penalty.517  Thus he was forced to choose between the 
district’s proposal to suspend and demote the principal—causing 
her to forfeit years of seniority and $12,000 annual pay—or to 
adopt the principal’s proposal of no more than a four-week 
suspension.518  Arbitrator Berquist selected the latter penalty.519  In 
contrast, in Daly520 the parties agreed beforehand to give the 
 
 511. Id. at 5-6. 
 512. Id. at 12-13. 
 513. MINN. STAT. §§ 122A.40, subd. 15(c), 122A.41, subd. 13(c) (2002). 
 514. See id. §§ 122A.40, subd. 15(c), 122A.41, subd. 13(c). 
 515. Gillson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 116, Pillager, BMS Case No. 98-TD-13 
(1998) (Imes, Arb.). 
 516. Id. at 10. 
 517. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709 & Grievant, BMS Case No. 99-TD-5, 6 (1999) 
(Berquist, Arb.). 
 518. Id. at 28-29. 
 519. Id. at 32. 
 520. Daly v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 152, Moorhead, BMS Case No. 00-TD-2 
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arbitrator authority to order a lesser penalty if she concluded the 
evidence did not support discharge.521  With this authority, the 
arbitrator reduced the discharge to a sixty-day unpaid suspension 
and gave the district the discretion to schedule that suspension to 
accommodate its curricular needs.522 
Thus, the parties have three choices concerning penalty: (1) 
go for broke and force the arbitrator to an all-or-nothing decision 
typically between discharge versus reinstatement and a make-whole 
award; (2) modify the all-or-nothing approach by proposing an 
alternative lesser penalty, thereby giving the arbitrator more 
options from which to choose; or (3) agree to grant the arbitrator 
authority to craft an appropriate penalty, should the evidence 
support discipline short of discharge. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Minnesota education law, as set forth in the Continuing 
Contract Act and the Teacher Tenure Act, has had a profound 
impact on Minnesota’s educational system and will continue to do 
so.  When these statutes are used to govern a teacher’s discharge 
“for cause,” the issues are complex and the stakes are high for 
everyone involved.  However, for all of the difficulties that 
surround this painful process, these statutes provide sound 
guidance to courts and arbitrators called upon to decide these 
matters.  Their thoughtful decisions have produced a body of 
authority and a system that, despite criticism of individual cases, 
most could agree is sound and workable. 
 
 
(2000) (Ver Ploeg, Arb.). 
 521. See id. at 13-15. 
 522. Id. at 20. 
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